THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

The Inaugural Lecture of Professor C. H. Dodd at Cambridge, *The Present Task in New Testament Studies* (Cambridge University Press, 2*s*.), is an important little publication. Dr. Dodd surveys the course of events during recent generations. He suggests that in the realm of textual criticism the golden age was from 1840 to 1881 (Tischendorf to Westcott and Hort). In higher criticism it was the last quarter of the same century. Much solid work was then done on the Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline Epistles, though the problem of the Fourth Gospel was, and is still, unsolved. Since then the Jewish and the Hellenistic backgrounds of early Christianity have been explored. From that has come illumination, genuine and considerable, but conclusions have sometimes been drawn over-hastily from occasional and non-significant parallels. At the same time numerous examples of the common non-literary Greek of the period have been brought to light. There again it was assumed at first by some that all that was required for New Testament exegesis was to ascertain the meaning and usage of the words among the business community in Egypt. Now it is seen more clearly that for the explanation of any passage "we are referred back to the whole context of early Christian life and thought." In fact it makes a difference that the common words were used by Christians, within the life of the Church, to express Christian ideas. The methods of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* were valuable, but Christianity is after all one of the religions to be remembered and taken into consideration.

This necessary reference to the Church leads to the subject of *Formgeschichte*, which is not simply a classification of "patterns," but at its best is a quest for the "setting in life" (*Sitz im Leben*) of the earliest Christian traditions. It begins

to look as if the work of interpretation, always admitted to be the real goal of Bible study, though sometimes obscured by the necessity of excavating facts, can now go forward well. There are unfinished problems, and no lack of work for specialists still to do, but masses of accurate knowledge are available, and though there is always a danger of inventing interpretations which would fit some only of the facts and of imposing "modern" interpretations on ancient material, it may be hoped that the treatment of early Christian documents will from now be less piecemeal than it has been. In particular, there is reason to hope that if the Fourth Gospel can be studied in this way, in the environment of the ideas that were in Christian circulation at the time of its writing, it will not only be better understood itself, but will contribute very much to the understanding of the remainder of the New Testament. Three things—the idea of the Kingdom in the Synoptic Gospels, the Christ-mysticism of St. Paul, and the Johannine Logos-theology—have been closely scrutinized and their derivations have been traced back to remote ancestries, often very different from one another. This is all very well, but those three ideas were all held together somehow in the Christian community. "The centrifugal movement needs to be balanced by a centripetal movement which will bring those ideas, now better understood in their individual character, into the unity of the life that originally informed them." Finally, there is a salutary reminder of a constant temptation. Ours not to pick and choose, but "to grasp the whole first-century Gospel in its temporary, historical and therefore actual reality, and then to make the bold, even perilous attempt to translate the whole into contemporary terms." It is plain that the new Norris-Hulse Professor has taken a shrewd survey of the past and of the present, and has a clear aim for the future. And it would also appear that any fears which may possibly have been entertained when for the first time a Free Churchman was appointed to a Cambridge Chair of Divinity may be dismissed. Professor Dodd will not expect to find the solution of New Testament problems in a vacuum. No one who knew him ever supposed that he would, but the Church public will now be reassured.

The September number of the *Modern Churchman*, published on September 15, too late for notice in our October number, is full of meat. It is an interesting and important set of papers read at the Girton Conference on "What to Believe." Among the best things in it are the first three articles by Dr. Matthews on "Reason and Religion," by Mr. G. H. L. Harvey on "From

Fact to Faith," and by Mr. J. C. Hardwick on "What to Believe about Man." Almost the whole series is the work of parish priests. We congratulate the Modern Churchman's Union in having among its clerical members in the parishes so many well-read theologians. On the whole it seems to register an advance in doctrinal strength, and it is noticeable that many of the "spicy bits" which were quoted at the time in the daily Press appear here with their reasonable necessary qualifications. Yet there is, as often, a certain difficulty in ascertaining precisely what is meant. Mr. J. R. C. Webb, for example, says that "the Christian religion is based upon an affirmative answer" to the question raised by the Cross. Yet of the conviction of the Apostles that the Lord was Risen he can only say, "How they came to believe that Jesus was still with them we have no means of knowing. There is no difficulty in believing that it was through the normal working of the human mind, conscious and subconscious, if behind it all is the Father-God." This does not help us very much. The words might be a description —rather a jejune and minimizing description—of the call of Abraham or some other Old Testament incident. They do not seem to contain any Christology at all, or any reference to what our Lord had been in the days of His Ministry. There is, of course, a context in which many things of a constructive kind are said, but the words quoted are content to refer to human minds and the Father-God.

In much the same way Mr. R. D. Richardson, at one point, following Professor Dodd, says, "God at last entered history decisively in Jesus Christ." He then says, "Yet I do not like the word '*entered* decisively into history.'" Nevertheless he adds, "Yet the fact remains that there are at times fuller emergencies into history of the Divine Spirit, and that Jesus is a decisive revelation of the character and Will of God." How much, we wonder, does he mean by that? Another mysterious passage is that in which Dr. Major, speaking of "the truths of literary criticism," remarks of all questions concerning the date, place, authorship, character, etc., of Biblical literature that "these truths may only be believed if proved true at the bar of literary criticism," and then goes on to say, "The same applies to Christian historical truths such as the Virgin Birth, the Physical Resurrection of Jesus Christ on the third day, the Ascension on the fortieth day after the Resurrection, and so on. They can only be rightly held to be true if proved to be so by scientific historic research." We do not want to suggest that there is an irrational region out of which irrefutable arguments can suddenly be produced which

will compel assent. But is it really true that the fact of the Ascension *could be proved to be true by scientific historic research?* Historical considerations have a bearing on it. It purports *inter alia* to be an event of history, and must therefore be historically criticized. But if it occurred at all, it must be more than history.

This is brought out well in Dr. Micklem's recent book *What is the Faith?* (Hodder and Stoughton, 7*s.* 6*d.*). Dr. Micklem wrote an article in *Mysterium Christi* (1930) in which he pleaded eagerly and eloquently for the relegation of Chalcedonian and other "past Christologies" to retirement. "As the Cross is the best symbol of Christianity, so the name 'Christ' is the best symbol and expression of the Church's faith in Jesus." What we want is something that is not metaphysical at all. The Editor of this Journal felt that this was gravely inadequate, and said so in the columns of the *Guardian*, but it appears that Dr. Micklem's fellow Free Churchmen were not disturbed by it. Some of them praised him for his boldness in shaking off the old fetters. It now seems to him that he was doing less than justice to the religion of the New Testament, and had not fully analyzed the intellectual basis of his own unquestionable religious faith. Those who have read his essay on "The Sacraments" in a recent Mansfield College symposium called *Christian Worship*, and noted the strength of his Catholic belief, will not be surprised. In *What is the Faith?* he points out that Christianity is not a philosophy but a story. Certain elements in the total Christian tradition are essential to the story. "Much of the profound speculation concerning the Person of Jesus belongs to the sphere of theology and is not immediately given in the deposit of faith; on the other side, the apprehension both of God and of man in Christ is of the very essence of the revelation." "If the Incarnation can be better expressed than in the Two Natures doctrine, we may rejoice. But there seems at present no alternative." Dr. Micklem has emancipated himself from the distrust of metaphysical affirmations which he once seems to have shared with the Modern Churchmen, and to have reached stronger ground. He finds the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection and the Ascension to be mysteries, but at the same time to be essential to the story. The story "cannot be told without the assertion (in some form of words or other) that God 'was made man'—that is, that He assumed our nature without loss of His own."

MODERN HUMANISM AND ITS DENIAL OF THE SUPERNATURAL

I

In a sense humanism is the philosophy of every man. When Protagoras stated that "man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is and of what is not, that it is not," he enunciated a principle from which it is possible to dissent only if we affirm that no valid judgments on any subject are possible to man. Man cannot jump out of his own shadow; and his ultimate reliance on his own judgment is the shadow which perpetually accompanies his thinking. The normal man believes that his shadow is caused by the light of the sun, over which he professes to have no control, and he would adduce in support of that belief the fact that when the sun, or other light, disappears his shadow disappears too. He may be wrong in his belief, and in his trust in the evidence he adduces for it. There is no reason why human observation, still less human deductions from observation, should correspond to the truth. There is, indeed, no reason why there should be such categories as true and untrue. Those of us, and we are in a vast majority—again, let us remark, no reasonable proof of our rightness—who do trust, who do believe, in ultimate values, do so because otherwise we find the universe, and thought about the universe, ourselves and thought about ourselves, strictly intolerable. We cannot endure it; and, as a wise woman of our own time said, "What can't be endured must be cured."

The axiom or paradox—call it which you will—that man is the measure of all things is the philosophical analogue of the religious axiom that, in the last resort, religion is a matter of private judgment. Conscience is the sole final arbiter. This is so strongly held by the rigid theologians of Western scholasticism that their textbooks lay it down as a principle that a man commits sin who does not follow his conscience when his conscience bids him to do or to believe something which the Church condemns.

As that now unfashionable author, Matthew Arnold, pointed out years ago, it is more important for men, especially for English people who are conscience-ridden, to examine their consciences before they follow them. The unexamined, unaired conscience is a nasty source of infection, acting very like damp or dry-rot in a building. The fact that you must follow a certain guide is no assurance that the guide is not a blind deaf-mute; if you

have taken no pains to secure for your conscience the freedom which authority alone gives, you will scarcely be acquitted of a grave dereliction of a primary duty. In short, before it is safe to follow conscience, a man must see to it that his conscience is informed, is disciplined, is free from the lightness of caprice, the cruelty of prejudice and the luxury of rebellion.

Now a good deal of modern humanism is the result of a misinformed conscience: it is easy for those of us who accept the sanctions of Christian morality to forget that, at this present time, our chief warfare is not with unconscientious Christians—they may sap the strength of the body by their weakness, but they make no deliberate assault—but our dangerous enemies are those who, conscientiously, adopt an un-Christian or an anti-Christian point of view, and of these points of view the most dangerous are the various forms of philosophical and popular humanism. They are the most dangerous because at their best they have a fine nobility which appeals to that in man which is exalted and splendid, and at their worst—as in certain political movements—they appeal to the least noble, the most degenerate and selfish traits in human nature. I want in this essay to examine the credentials of this humanism, and to discuss the force of its adherents' teaching about the supernatural.

II

I will not, except incidentally, discuss scientific humanism. Mr. H. G. Wood has dealt with it in *Christianity and the Crisis*.

The word, the idea, supernatural has fallen on to evil days. No pedlar of new philosophies is so poor but that he can cock a snook at it. It has been abandoned even by such professing Christians as Professor MacMurray, in fear that the lips of his Communist friends can never be persuaded to utter it. And Dr. Barnes abandons it, I suppose because it won't fit any mathematical formula. Worse than that, many who still use it, use it apologetically. They are too anxious to assure themselves that they are "modern"—a quality so futile as a term of either praise or dispraise that its use can only be explained by virtue of the general rot which has infected the use of language. "Modern" is merely a more solemn equivalent of such terms as "fin-de-siècle" and "up-to-date," and has as little strict meaning as that other word, popular since its adoption by Mr. Clive Bell in a discussion on painting, "significant." Significant of what? Modern to whom? Let us dismiss it with that other odd expression of tense-eyed eulogy "contemporary."

We should insist on the word supernatural, for on the idea

of the supernatural the whole structure of our religion depends. It is needless to define the word too precisely; indeed, it is undesirable. What we mean by it is plain enough. We live in a world full of beauty and terror, subject to changes and chances at once magnificent and monstrous; watching, in the lives of animals and plants, an existence of strain and struggle, of loveliness and anguish, of transitory triumph, of apparent decay and, so far as any one observer can tell, of ever-renewed and seasonal quickness, over-arched by a firmament the denizens of which have weight and position calculable by the astronomers, but to the ordinary man seem as innumerable as the grains of sand that fringe the encircling ocean or make desolate the desert places. That is the world of the man who measures things; yet that same man, so far as we have any trustworthy records of what he has felt and thought, is aware of another world, a world which, as has been said by a modern idealist, "is presupposed in human experience but is not found there," a world of qualities, of values, of aspirations and of despairs, a world of which some would contend the phenomenal world is but a pattern and a symbol, and which all who are Christians believe to have a reality, a virtue which alone can give meaning to human existence. That world is the supernatural. And we refuse to surrender the word or the idea, because if we do not hold to it, we must at the same time abandon any belief in revelation; and with the abandonment of that belief the entire edifice of Christian religion and theology is undermined. It is as well to insist on this, because it has not, I think, been sufficiently recognized by those writers who, in their well-meaning efforts to recommend Christianity to the outside world, are prepared to strip it of any characteristics which can offend certain fashions in philosophy. We must not forget that there are many powers in the world that it is our business to offend. And one such is the spirit which says "that supernaturalism can find no place in a civilized world theory," since "the practice of mankind has shewn that there is no human activity that achieves its purpose by Divine intervention." In opposition to that we claim that human activity is only effective in so far as men recognize God's help and God's aim for mankind, and that it is man's business to achieve not any purpose of his own, but to strive towards the realization and perfection of God's plan for man.

III

For man. Man is an animal. His relationship to the other animals was acknowledged in the Middle Ages and in earlier times by a custom of assimilating the animals to man—in our

own times, especially since the rise of Darwinism, there has been a tendency to emphasize rather man's likeness to animals by putting him on their level; and it would not have required a very acute intelligence to foresee that, when the Cartesians asserted that the beasts were automata (a view the danger of which not even Pascal seems to have realized), that opinion would be extended to cover man also. Man is an animal. For theists and for Christians, who admit this, Man is distinguished from all other animals by the fact that God willed for him a peculiar destiny. Made in God's image, he is to lead his life so that he may justify the astonishing optimism of God. For man is destined to see God as He is, and anyone who reaches the glory of the Beatific Vision is as near the Divine as it is possible for a creature to be.

Humanism is the denial of all this. It would be tedious to trace the history of Humanism from its beginnings. Some of its most pointed arguments, such as the saying of Protagoras, now used to support it, were never intended to bear the superstructure now built upon them. It is enough, for my present purpose, which is, after all, the discussion of modern Humanism, to point out that its beginnings can be found in Descartes. The Dean of St. Paul's, who is no enemy to modern philosophy, says that "there is, of course, some truth in the contention," frequently put forward by the neo-Thomists of France, "that the modern world began to depart from the *philosophia perennis* with Descartes, and has been astray ever since." Descartes, however, was not by intention non-theistic; and we can now regard two names as central in the development and the statement of modern Humanism, Auguste Comte and his Positivist philosophy, William James and the Pragmatism which, in the hands of Schiller and his followers, became what we now know as Humanism.

Comte believed that, though the age of science, the positive age, had come not to pass away, men still needed a religion; his position, that is, was not unlike that held by Julian Huxley or by J. B. S. Haldane. So he proposed as a candidate for the throne, now empty of God, Man—ἀνθρωπος, the measure of all things. His cult and his mythology had a considerable success among the Victorian intelligentzia—and it is worth noticing how little separates these grave seniors from our up-to-date humanists—except, and it is a grave exception, their moral seriousness. The reason for this exception will be discussed later. Now the Comtist position, at its highest and most moving, was stated by two masters of the English language. Here is one:

> The dim and shadowy outlines of the superhuman deity fade slowly from before us; and as the mist of his presence floats aside, we perceive

with greater and greater clearness the shape of a yet grander and nobler figure—of Him who made all Gods and shall unmake them.

From the dim dawn of history, and from the inmost depths of every soul, the face of our father Man looks out upon us with the fire of eternal youth in his eyes, and says, "Before Jehovah was, I am."

That was written by W. K. Clifford in the late seventies of the last century. And here from a poem, roughly of the same period, is Swinburne's statement of the same conviction. In the poem the speaker is Hertha, the earth-mother, and the poem is an impassioned plea for the truth not of Pantheism but of Pananthropism.

I that saw where ye trod
The dim paths of the night
Set the shadow call'd God
In your skies to give light;
But the morning of manhood is risen, and the shadowless soul is in sight.

* * * * *

Lo, wing'd with world's wonders,
With miracles shod,
With the fires of his thunders
For raiment and rod,
God trembles in heaven, and His angels are white with the terror of God.

For his twilight is come on him,
His anguish is here;
And his spirits gaze dumb on him
Grown gray with his fear;
And his hour taketh hold on him stricken, the last of his infinite year.

Thought made him and breaks him,
Truth slays and forgives;
But to you, as time takes him,
This new thing it gives
Even love, the Belovèd Republic, that feeds upon freedom and lives.

For truth only is living,
Truth only is whole,
And the love of his giving
Man's polestar and pole;
Man pulse of my centre, and fruit of my body, and seed of my soul.

One birth of my bosom;
One beam of mine eye;
One topmost blossom
That scales the sky;
Man equal and one with me, man that is made of me, man that is I.

Before I go on to more recent varieties of humanism I should like to consider some aspects of this faith pronounced with such eloquence—an eloquence only reached among its inheritors

by that other later Victorian, Bertrand Russell. The first thing to notice is the highly mythological character of the faith presented for our acceptance as a scientific statement. Where can the Man be found? Who is this auto-anthropoid, nobler than any of his discovered gods, for whom our allegiance is demanded? Even as Clifford was writing, his magnificent figure was in the process of careful destruction by the anthropologists; and Swinburne's shadowless soul of Man has, since *Hertha* was written, had bound upon his shoulders the innumerable burdens of the psycho-analysts, loads which for weight and weariness far exceed the bundle which fell from the back of Christian as, on his progress, he greeted the Cross of Christ.

The humanists of Comte's day were still influenced by the Christian tradition. The *Imitation of Christ* was George Eliot's favourite book; Frederic Harrison, to the end of his long life, persisted in his devotion to that liturgical Positivism which endeavoured, as a wit of the time said, to keep all of Catholicism except Christianity; even James Thomson, the angry and bitter poet, the atheist of *The City of Dreadful Night*, was not content except he write his blasphemies on the walls of the sacred building. There is a world of difference between the man who breaks into a church or desecrates it and the man who passes it by, or simply does not see it or, worst of all, wishes to preserve it as a charming example of ancestral superstition.

The passage I have quoted from W. K. Clifford is full of Christian echoes. This remarkable young scientist—had he lived he would be ten years older than Mr. Bernard Shaw—can scarcely, I think, have been deaf to the overtones of the sentences I have read. It is surely ironical that he should have failed to recognize that this Man he acclaims had really existed, had lived precisely to make it possible for us to use such language about Man at his highest, that in this defiant proclamation of a new God he was only paying tribute to Him who loved to call Himself the Son of Man.

And Swinburne's Man? Man who is also Nature? Man who is everything that Nature is? Whence does he come, that he should receive the glory snatched from God and his pale Galilean? This man has had a brief and rather melancholy history. Or at least a melancholy one, for he bears some traces of that legendary Adam who was all-wise and more than human in the attributes of size and strength. But he derives more immediately from that noble savage whom Voltaire and Rousseau set up to scare the pusillanimity and vicious sophistication of a civilization which the Encyclopædists embraced but could not satisfy. He is that idol of the early romantics, Man

unspoiled by priests and lawyers, the glorious Man who would no doubt smile approvingly when the adoring humanist strangles the last lawyer in the entrails of the last priest. He is kin, too, to that Druid Adam who caught hold of the fertile but ill-instructed imagination of William Blake; he inspired the enthusiasms of the young Shelley, and nearly sent out Southey and Coleridge to find or found an ideal republic in the wild savannahs of the West. Poor figure, the gilt is off him, and he is blown about by every wind of anthropological doctrine since Tylor and MacClennan to Ernest Crawley and Robert Briffault. What the anthropologists have left, the psychologists have taken, to construct their complexes and to support their inhibitions. Of that magnificent creature, his head touching the stars, his feet on the troubled tombstones of dead gods, his hands clasped lovingly in the hands of Nature, nothing at all is left but a vague whimper in the dark, a frightened murmur of one interrupted in sleep, a tiny, insignificant what-not, known to the initiate as the Id, which sits, grinning triumphantly, at the Ego and the Super-Ego, in uneasy occupancy of the unbeleaguered, undefended citadel of Mansoul.

IV

The humanism associated with the names of William James and F. C. S. Schiller has added little to the Comtist argument; but I must interpose a brief discussion of the two studies which have done most towards making the change from the rather splendid humanism of Comte and his disciples to the less admirable systems which we could, until recently, associate with Aldous Huxley, Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt. I have already remarked that one of the greatest differences between Victorian humanism and that of yesterday—there is none of to-day except among old men and a few not very original scientists—is the decline in moral seriousness. To what is that decline due? No doubt it is due in very large part to the inevitable cracking of the Victorian compromise, by which Christian morality was to be kept and Christian theology jettisoned. No one who looks at the world to-day can fail to see how lamentably that expectation has been cheated. But there are other reasons: and the two greatest are the importance given to anthropology and to psychology. I would say nothing in dispraise of these studies. Since I was a boy I collected eagerly all the anthropological books I could lay my hands on, and I still try, so far as I have time, to read new books on the subject. Fortunately for me I have also a passion for fairy-stories and folk-lore, and I was by this kept

from a grave error which has overcome most students of the subject. Again, I was once moderately familiar with the writings of English, American and French psychologists; I cannot say I have kept myself acquainted with the voluminous literature in that craft, partly because of its excessive bulk, partly because so much of it is written in so vile a jargon. I only mention this to shew, not that I claim more than an amateur student's knowledge in either field, but that I have no distaste for either.

The harm done by the recent prominence of these two subjects is due to one simple cause. They are both treated, by the professors and the laity, as sciences. Now the distinctive quality of a science—as distinct from an art, a craft, or a mere mess—is this: science is the study of phenomena in any field where the material is constant. In medieval times the title "queen of the sciences" was given to theology, because theology had the one absolutely constant material—God. Leaving theology aside, however, the type of pure science is pure mathematics—and then comes logic, and all the physical sciences where the scholar deals with a definite, constant material, and where his results are, as far as possible, unaffected by the personal equation. Various other studies have in the past been called sciences, and no great harm done; but the rage of a physician who hears a surgeon called a scientist is as nothing beside the rage of a physicist to whom one chatters of the science of medicine. Now in no legitimate sense is psychology or anthropology a science. In both studies the fact which Mr. Wells calls the fallibility of the instrument—the observer's mind—plays too large a part. In neither is the material constant for a moment. There is nothing certain about the human mind except its uncertainty. There is nothing certain about the behaviour of those primitive people who are the chief object of the anthropologists' study except their pleasure in pulling the inquirer's leg. I do not mean that many psychologists and more anthropologists have not established some very valuable truths about the human mind and about primitive culture. I am persuaded that they have; but each subject is liable to an indefinite number of mistakes, due to the inconstancy of the material, and the fact that no investigator in either field can possibly rid himself of those prejudices in his own mind which make scientific appraisement impossible. How strong is this factor of personal prejudice can be easily seen by comparing equally honest observers: if you read two textbooks on crystals, you will, I imagine, get the same information in each book, though its presentation may differ. But, as we know, there are at least as many psychologies

as psychologists, and Malinowski's Trobrianders differ in a way which no mere geographical or racial distinction can explain from George Calderon's Tahitians or Spencer and Gillen's Australians.

Few modern scientists would deny these facts, yet when they philosophize they ignore them. In the face of the varied and conflicting facts and theories about man and his mind, they still base some vague doctrine of humanism on an assumed identic quality in Man. They are like some mad philatelist who would insist, because every stamp is a stamp, that it could not matter what stamp you stuck on a letter in what country. The anthropologists have destroyed that legendary human hero whom Clifford and Swinburne exalted to the throne of God and saw clothed upon with the power and terror and the beauty of the universe; but we still find agnostic humanists offering their little essays—not, alas! as a burnt sacrifice—on an altar with the strange inscription To The Unknown Man. Bertrand Russell, as H. G. Wood points out, while insisting that man and the stars are the products of a natural law which the physicist is in process of discovering, also suggests that "it is quite doubtful if there are any laws of nature," and that "the universe is all spots and jumps." The psychologist has destroyed the unity of man's mind; even though he may not adhere to the belief that all mind is matter in ordained or fortuitous pattern, he can surely predicate about it nothing but its hopeless pluralism, its troublesome internecine strife. In short, while James and Schiller were preaching with a rare eloquence the beauty of the new humanism, the death-watch beetle of psycho-analysis was already snug in the rafters, and no medicine of theirs can prevent it from the joyful business of the demolition of the altar and the pulpit. Yet some of the minor apostles of humanism have attempted a new way of escape. It has been more obvious in the arts—especially literature and painting—than in philosophy; but although never directly avowed it has, I think, been implicit in some philosophical writing, and it has had very obvious and very grievous consequences in the world of politics.

Comte's worship of Man the Society was imperceptibly changed into Nietzsche's worship of the Superman. Man's social habits proved, on investigation, to be too disgusting and too superstitious for him to be the object of the pure socialist's adoration, so the Superman was brought in to redress the balance against God. This new Gnosticism has had disciples here, the most notable of whom is Bernard Shaw, though he has never been exclusive in his devotion. Except for

the fact that the Superman has had distinguished advocates, and that the political consequences of his worship have been so serious, there would be no need to dwell at all on a figure who is merely a reproduction of the Man without Scruples, written of by Byron and Southey and other romantics, now furnished, on the hire-purchase system, with a few philosophical decorations. The change has been, that is, from ἀνθρωπος to ἄνηρ, from man to Me, from the social being to the egotist. No longer is Protagoras' man claimed to be the measure of all things; that rôle is given to some leader, or claimed by some tyrant. Man is displaced by the individual.

V

Some four hundred years ago two men in the city of Mexico went, escorted by hundreds of soldiers, chieftains, servants and courtiers, to the great temple which was the home of the religion of the Aztecs. One man was a European, about thirty-five years old, wearing the military armour of the period, glancing keenly from right to left at the treasures of the city, as he walked with quick, short, soldierly steps—and looking occasionally with a kind of childish condescension at his companion. The companion, a man of forty, was a Mexican. Robed hieratically, he moved with lonely dignity under the great canopy of green and gold, embroidered with silver and pearls: eight of his chiefs held the canopy. Before them, at a swifter pace, went other chieftains who spread cloths on the ground, so that the feet of their Emperor should not be defiled by contact with the earth. And as they walked all covered their faces. At the great gate of the temple, the priests, bowed before the high priest who was the high king, stood to receive him and the stranger he delighted to honour, the stranger who might, perchance, be a god. And then, obeisance done and loyalty protested, Cortez and Montezuma went up the 114 stairs to the altar of the Aztecs' gods. Every day Montezuma, who was a gentle, cultured and kindly man, sacrificed five persons with his royal hands: he looked on the images of his gods with the greatest and most patriotic reverence. There was enshrined Quetzacoatl, huge, misshapen, his face distorted by divine wrath, his body studded with jewels, and around his neck the necklaces of human heads and hearts of gold. Gravely Montezuma looked at Cortez, whom he had so honoured as to permit him into the holy of holies. Of course, as a foreigner, whether he were god or man, the Spaniard could not be present at the sacrifice, unless, indeed, being proved to be man, he achieved the felicitous destiny of a victim for the god. And Montezuma, waiting for expressions

of astonishment, awe and abasement, was horrified to hear from Cortez' lips the foulest blasphemies against the god and his worship; for a moment, indeed, he feared the Spaniard would outrage the sacred things by violence. This danger past, the Emperor, in sorrow and some anger, led his friend away. He could not make Cortez understand what was in his heart about these gods and their worship. He only knew that it was right, it was effective, it was holy. He himself was priest and victim; he was the slayer and the slain; as his knife-blade let free the blood of the sacrifices for the god's delight and his delight, in some mystical way the image of the god received also the blood from imperial veins. He was the god: and the god was the emperor. The life of the god depended on the lives of his worshippers, and the lives of the worshippers were assured by the life of the god: and he himself was at once worshipper and worshipped, man and God. He was a true if unscientific humanist.

He has his followers to-day. Four hundred years have passed, but modern humanism, preached as an ideal by scientists and philosophers, has had its terrible apostles in the world of action. We were taught that the French Revolution began, not with the burning of the Bastille, but with the publication of Rousseau's *Social Contract*. So, too, the revolutions that have occurred in Italy and Germany owe their origin to the writers' proclamation of the Superman, the Hero, the Leader. You need not go far to find a parallel to that scene between Cortez and Montezuma. Take any meeting in Berlin where the Führer is to speak. There are songs, the whole burden of which is the famous saying, "That which helps Germany is right, that which harms Germany is wrong: the will of the Führer is law." Slowly in the intense beam of the great lime-light advances the figure of the Führer, guarded by his company of adjutants, looking like great brown cockroaches as they march up the hall to the platform altar, and its god, The Crooked Cross. The human sacrifice is, it is true, generally conducted "off." The scientific humanist has learnt to be a trifle dainty in the arrangement of his shambles. So in prison-cells, in concentration camps, in the houses of fear in lonely villages, more rarely in the bedrooms of erstwhile colleagues, is spilled the blood, is wreaked the vengeance, is exacted the anguish which shall glut the appetite of the Man-God.

Again, it is romanticism made abominably actual. The hero of this foul and fantastic humanism is Frankenstein, and once more the monster he has made pursues him with terrible claims for his love and loyalty. Just as the Monster of Franken-stein could not understand why his advances were rejected,

his love met by loathing, his fidelity inspired disgust, so this modern monster blunders and swaggers across Europe insisting that we shall love it, or be damned. Any opposition can only be, as was Cortez' disgust, the fruit of ignorance and envy; as a German publicist has written: "We have many enemies. The foreigners who have lived among us know well that they have never comprehended the depth and the greatness of the German spirit. We have known them only too well. But they have never understood us; their soul tells them that."

What we do know, of course, is that there are thousands, nay, millions of Germans who would never willingly assent to this profane and bloody nonsense; but I believe that it is, this worship of the State, and of the Leader as the Soul of the State, a proper and logical consequence of religious humanism. We know that figure which is put up for our adoration. It is Moloch of the Carthaginians, with his fiery mouth and his burning belly yawning open for the children of Carthage; it is Baal, on whose high places the dervishes scream and stab and cut themselves with knives; it is Cybele—one with men and man with her—for whom Attis, crying aloud in an ecstasy of self-abasement, flings away his manhood; it is the great goat, to whom for many centuries more people than we know of had recourse from the discipline of Christianity. We know this God. Man adoring God can be the sublimest as the humblest of things on earth: Man adored is the Devil.

VI

The Devil. The Prince of this world. The Adversary. As I read discussions on the supernatural, I am struck by the absence of any reference to supernatural evil. Is not our war still with principalities and powers? Is there not enough hell on earth to convince us of the devil's reality? Anyway it seems to me that the devil comes in here. It is an ironical thing that the polite dropping of the devil by nearly all theologians, except a few Catholics and a few fundamentalists, should apparently have so enraged the men of the world that they have brought him back in triumph. That lovely medieval prayer, "Jesus, Jesus, give me here my purgatory," is answered horribly by bloody-minded men, "You shall get hell here and now."

I have never seen what rational objection there is to a belief in a principle of evil, whatever or whomever we call it. And may I interpose here a comment on a usual answer made to a common question? It is said with some emphasis that evil can never have the same reality as good, and that

whatever else it is, it can not be eternal. Now I agree heartily with the first part of his statement, and dissent vehemently from the second. The teaching of our Lord about supernatural evil is largely parabolic; but surely one thing is clear. He distinctly asserts the eternal character of Hell: the antithesis between eternal fire and eternal life is precise and unconditional. We have no right to speak of the glory of the saved as eternal unless we are prepared to use the same epithet of the doom of the damned. If there is a hell, if there be a Devil—and I believe in both—they have the character of eternity, according to the testimony of Jesus. This much by way of parenthesis, though perhaps I had better say that in my interpretation of the meaning of eternal and the final destiny of the devils and the damned I incline to the opinion of Origen and Clement.

Now there is a great warning and a great comfort in the doctrine of supernatural evil.

The warning—it is writ large at the moment, in the bodies, dead and alive, of men and women in the islands off Italy, in the timber camps of Russia, in the prisons of Germany, in the burning streets and churches of Spain. The warning is this: Humanism has its own peculiar end. The thrasonical cry of the Virgilian goddess becomes its ineluctable fate—*Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.* Man tries to be self-sufficient. He and Nature—sweet gossips—shut themselves up in an air-tight house; the temperature is level and hygienic, the atmosphere is conditioned, the lighting is subdued and cunningly hidden; the windows that look toward the horizon are shuttered and barred; the sky-light is closed and blackened, lest any hint of heaven should enter—he and Nature, for Nature and he are one, are snug together in their machine-made house. Then there is a little shiver in the house, a murmur of some quake, infinitely distant—and man runs downstairs to the cellar of his determined, lawful dwelling, and there he finds a tiny crack, and sees a little puff of smoke coming through the crack. And as he watches, the crack grows wide; and as he watches, little spurts of flame follow the smoke. And his heart, rebelling against his reason, rejoices—here is something incalculable in his calculated life—and he leans over the crack, now a respectable chimney, and sniffs at the thick sulphurous smoke, and plays with the green flames and the blue flames and the golden flames, and basks in the promise of brimstone. And as he plays and sniffs, the chimney becomes a furnace, the furnace a raging tornado of fire, and he darts eagerly and gladly into the heart of hell.

Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo. Shut out heaven, all hell will break in. Dismiss God, and the Devil will

come. Nature abhors a vacuum—and there is no absence so fatal to the natural life as the absence of its supernatural background and support; and if you will not have that from the hands of goodness, you will have it thrust at you by the claws of evil. If you choose for your worship this world, and yourself as its symbol and governor, sooner or later homage will be required of you by the Prince of this World, Lucifer, Star of the Morning, who is also as you are, created, and dependent and denying.

And there is comfort in the doctrine. For if we believe the word of Jesus that hell is eternal, we are thereby assured—and the assurance is needed by those who would reduce goodness and truth and beauty to humanist inventions—that things created, things dependent, things denying are permitted, by the merciful justice of God, to share in His eternity.

And while His eternity is changeless, passionless, incomprehensible, this given, this acquired eternity which belongs to the creature is by the very term of the great legend of the archangelical rebellion not incapable of change. So there is hope in hell; and, indeed, if there were not, what hope would there be in a world which, meant to pattern itself on the heavenly original, persists in transporting here for our misery the fires and the filth and the disgustingness of the Infernal?

VII

What arguments can we use to combat modern humanism? It should, perhaps, be enough to point out that Carlyle's hero-worship and Nietzsche's Superman have ended in the grotesque and terrible figures of the hysterical Hitler, the malicious Goebbels, and the operatic Göring; that the older theory, intellectually much less disreputable, of Comte, and Clifford and Swinburne which exalted *ἄνθρωπος*, not *ἀνηρ*, ended in the violence and ruthlessness of Soviet Russia; but the humanists who are purely philosophical—if there are any left—will insist rightly that a theory is not proved to be untrue because its results are terrible, and might argue that their theory is perverted by others' practice.

First I must make a personal statement. I am by temperament incapable of understanding the mind which finds it difficult to believe in the supernatural. I believe that the difficulty is felt; but I cannot myself comprehend it. My trouble is to believe in the world of science, not the world of faith, in the world of fact, not in the world of values; and to me the one ultimately mysterious creature is he who proudly calls himself a plain man who believes the evidence of his senses.

It is the sensuous, visible, recurrent world of every day which I find it hard to credit; and the odd thing is that, rather late in the day, men of science have come to the same conclusion, and are ready to affirm that the whole visible universe, from the Milky Way to a mote in a sunbeam, whatever it may be, is certainly not what it seems.

Still the men of science do rely for their statements about the nature of things, however much they may vary in different years or in different schools, on certain rules of observation and deduction. All laws of science—if there are any—are arrived at by a method agreed to be the best for the purpose. And these methods fail to discover in the world subject to such observation any hint of the supernatural. Yet there is here a fundamental fallacy. Let us assume that scientific methods of observation, properly used, must arrive at correct results; let us assume that no man of science ever allows any personal bias to affect his judgment on any subject; let us assume that his statement of the result of his observations is a perfect expression of his precise meaning—and these are all rather large assumptions. A difficulty still remains. All this elaborate science is dependent ultimately on a purely mystical assumption, for which there is no scientific evidence whatsoever. The man of science assumes that he *can* observe, that there is a world for him to observe—he assumes, that is, the whole highly disputable theory of subject and object, and goes on from that to the even extremer assumption of the theory of cause and effect. I am in hearty accord with him when he says this objection is rubbish; that solipsism (the belief that only "I" exists) or nihilism (that nothing exists) are both intolerable theories: they are. But they are not intolerable on a purely humanist, scientific theory: they are only intolerable in a theory which claims that there is an eternal order, an eternal reason, an eternal love.

You have to pray God in aid if you are to deny God.

Now for a second answer. You will find that all the greatest exponents of humanism, when they are at the height of their argument, fall back into language, and betray a mental attitude, which re-establish the very position they are seeking to deny.

I will give one example, from Bertrand Russell's Philosophical Essays:

> When, without bitterness of impotent rebellion, we have learnt both to resign ourselves to the outward rule of Fate and to recognize that the non-human world is unworthy of our worship, it becomes possible at last so to transform and refashion the unconscious universe, so to transmute it in the crucible of imagination, that a new image of shining gold replaces the old idol of clay. In all the multiform facts of the world, in the visual shapes of trees and mountains and clouds, in the events

of the life of man, even in the very omnipotence of Death—the insight of creative idealism can find the reflection of a beauty which its own thoughts first made. In this way mind asserts a subtle mastery over the thoughtless forces of Nature. . . . Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and on all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.

Now if we examine that passage we shall find again and again phrases that have no meaning unless we accept a non-humanistic view of the universe. Take one, "the reflection of a beauty that its own thoughts have made." Is that beauty the reflection of a reflection only? Is the made beauty real? If it is real, is it not part of nature? Is nature part of matter? If so, how can matter which contains this beauty made by man, and contains also man himself, be blind to good and evil? How can it be thoughtless? How can man, again, if he be but a minute atom in a world spotting and jumping, obtain mastery, subtle or otherwise, over his immense container? What is the whole passage, except it be an exhortation to lift yourself up by your own illusions, but a poetic protest against the creed which in his heart Bertrand Russell finds it impossible to accept?

My last answer is an appeal to history and experience. Can humanism bear the appeal to man? Surely we have a right, if we frame any theories about this creature Man, to pay most attention to those whose names the judgment of the world has decided are the examples and the splendour of our race? Is a knowledge of men and women no necessary part of humanism? Can we accept any theory of human nature as respectable, if it dismisses as cheats or dupes those whom humanity delights to honour, and exalts for imitation? Against a seclusive and cabined humanism is ranged a formidable army of immortal souls. Not only the mystics, who know; not only the saints, who have seen; not only the martyrs, who have suffered; not only the confessors and doctors, who have learnt and tried to teach what they learnt; not only the prophets, who have spoken; not only the priests, who have served; not only the pious people, of many centuries, who are the torch-

bearers and the lamp-lighters of truth. These are opposed to the Man-God. But with them, if you search into their works, are all the poets, the painters, the sculptors, all men who work for other than gain and live for something sweeter than bread, all who have died for love, all who have lived for love, all who have thought reason well lost for a rhyme, and can forfeit the respect of men for a song or a patch of colour—these, these are with us, allies often unwelcomed, allies who may be inconvenient in manners and disreputable in conduct, but all, in their various ways, all according to the gifts God has given them, as they march beside the saints and the virgins under the canopy of angelic wings, proclaiming aloud—Where there is no God, there is no man. Glory to God in the highest!

R. Ellis Roberts.

THE OUTER DARKNESS

Every age of Christians has its religious fashions. Peculiar attention is given to certain subjects, while others are ignored or even ruled out.

One of the direct results is that whole sections of the New Testament fall into neglect for the time. If such neglect is allowed to continue, we have, once more, a distorted version of Christianity, which will do a great deal of mischief before the inevitable day when reaction comes, armed with weapons taken from the New Testament itself. Then the parts of the New Testament which have been so popular will share in the odium of the newly slain travesty of Christianity, and another distortion will result. It is therefore the duty of those responsible for the healthy-mindedness of the Church to make a stand against current fashions, and to try to obtain fair play for the whole of the subject-matter of the New Testament. Now, it is clear that, at present, the generality of Christians pay little or no regard to the extensive and important parts of the New Testament which speak of the Day of Judgment. No doubt this is partly because those passages have become encrusted with parasitical growths, which were fostered by the fancies and the vindictiveness of former ages, growths which adhere so firmly to the minds of most readers that though they are mere shells of tradition, yet they are regarded as parts of the vital truth. But, all the same, the passages themselves are part of the deposit. Indeed it would be seen that they are a valuable part if, instead of being buried in a dead context, they were read in the context of the events of the last twenty

years. And, this, indeed, is probably true even outside such a relevant set of events as those through which we have passed and are passing. At any time, it might have been found more profitable to read the Apocalyptic passages as referring to the present rather than to the future. For one of the amazing features of the New Testament is that it never gets away from practical life and the needs of every day. No doubt, the eschatological statements have a peculiar use in enabling men to look forward from dark days to brighter. But they are never mere predictions, to be taken on trust. They form an analysis of life, always sufficiently verifiable to provide a support for faith, and to prove of practical value in enabling men to understand the world in which they live. It is high time that the eschatological passages should cease to be treated as archæological curiosities, and that their direct message to our times be made clear. But to do this it is necessary to get rid of the idea that, even if they be true, they relate solely to the future.

As it is impossible to deal with the whole subject in one article, I propose to consider the saying, thrice reported in St. Matthew: "Cast . . . into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (viii. 12,* xxii. 13, xxv. 30). It will be most convenient to take, first, xxii. 13, where the clause is dependent on the parable of the man who had not on a wedding garment. This is plainly and explicitly a parable of the Kingdom. And it has traditionally been referred to that open Coming of the Kingdom which is called the Last Day. The usage is, of course, well justified. It may, however, be pointed out that if the sole purpose of describing the Last Day be to encourage believers, the parable might easily be wrested so as to give the enthusiastic Christian encouragement to gloat over the fate of the duller brethren. But, apart from this, the question arises, Was our Lord, in speaking to a general audience or to His followers, in pursuance of His task of explaining the Kingdom to them, dealing with a future crisis, in isolation, and indeed in contrast with the present? Were they to understand the "outer darkness" as a part of the unknown future, quite unlike this present life? Or was He referring to something in the present life which would provide a pointer towards the future, and even help to shew what elements in present life are really fraught with danger for the future?

It might be more natural to seek the beginning of the answer in the Shabby Man as he first presents himself, but as we are bound to take into account the three passages, it is more convenient to fasten on the common phrase and begin with his fate. In doing so, let me say that I am not quarrelling with any other

* Also, in an imperfect form, in xiii. 50.

interpretation or displacing it, but trying to see whether the hearers were given a foothold in known facts. Were they transported with a jerk out of the familiar atmosphere of a village wedding into that of the Last Assize, or were they referred to something just as familiar as a wedding, in order to enable them to understand the later and greater occasion? If we leave aside, for the moment, all the pageantry of the Judgment, and think—as they must have thought first—of a man flung into a dark street, we shall recognize that which had befallen him as a familiar sight in our lives, perhaps a not unfamiliar state of our own hearts. "In outer darkness, where are weeping and gnashing of teeth." He is made to feel an outsider, he is plunged in gloom, he is very sorry for himself and he is full of fury. Add to that the additional touch that he is bound hand and foot, and you get that awful state of constriction which is characteristic of rage, not only when baffled by outward circumstances,* but when it reaches that pitch from which there is no release. In short, the saying is an acute psychological study of a man in a bad temper. Though some of its elements are contradictory, the sense of humiliation according badly with the fierce revengefulness, some of us have not only perceived that they form part of the reason which makes a man in a bad temper ridiculous, but learnt by experience that one can himself combine them quite seriously. Consider the elements of this complex separately.

When a man is in a bad temper he is an outsider. He stands apart, in complete isolation. The appeals of reason and of affection do not touch him. Society is repellent to him. His grievance alienates him not only from its perpetrators, but from those unconcerned in it. He hugs his grievance apart. His mental outlook is dark. All life lies under a shadow. The joy and humour of others only increase his gloom. They are irritants. But the strange, grotesque, and even ridiculous feature of this condition is the combination of "weeping and gnashing of teeth," the sense of lamentable and hopeless weakness, mingled with an arrogant and violent belief in his power to humiliate others. In the same instant he is a feeble slave and a powerful tyrant in his own estimation.

This consideration of the contents of our Lord's phrase justifies the instinct which has caused Christendom to regard it as a description of Hell, though it is to be noted that our Lord does not so style it. No more complete antithesis to the Kingdom, with its sociability, its glory, the dignity of the

* It is true that we associate rage with furious action, but, as a matter of fact, such action, like that of the lunatic, is usually prompted by fear, rather than by the wrath itself.

Sons of God and their glad obedience to the King, can be imagined. And those of us who have been plunged into this state know how completely it cuts us off from the God of Christ. No god is left save an angry and exaggerated replica of ourselves—and we are not prepared to abjure our arrogance even in his favour. Camouflaged or plain, it is self-worship. It is the realization of this which makes one understand that this state is not the nemesis or apotheosis of rage alone, but the issue of all selfishness, and of the rejection of God, or even of spirituality. I must say, for myself at least, that the wider my knowledge of humanity grows, the more accurate do I find this generalization. If anyone doubts it, let him look, for example, at any of the celebrated thrusters of our day, and note their chronic petulance. Such persons, and there are many of them, are recalling us to the knowledge that we have not to choose between a greater and less degree of Christianity, but between Christ and a type fatally and suicidally opposed to Him. I say suicidal, because, in this condition, a man is killing himself. For life consists in a capacity to adjust oneself to environment, and the angry man neither can nor will adjust himself. The fulness of life depends on the richness and variety of the calls which we hear and to which we respond, But the angry man is a man of one idea, that "fixed idea" which is characteristic of lunacy, held in utter disregard of the complexity of life. Another reason for calling this morbid mental activity suicide, *felo de se*, is that it is self-inflicted and deliberately self-inflicted. Try to take away the angry man's grievance, and he insists on it. Indeed, one of the grotesque features of bad temper is the fear that the grievance may prove unfounded. Like the sullen guest, the aggrieved person often fears to state his grievance because of a lurking suspicion that it may prove to be baseless. Once again, some of us can testify, from experience, to the power of this "dumb devil." Thus another neglected phrase of the New Testament finds its justification in experience. But a more disquieting, though less noticed, fact is that a man may come to choose this state and even desire it. It is one of the strange morbidities of pride that it is not only willing to endure these distresses, but to accept them as the price of being a person apart. On the other hand, it is strange to note that a pride born of such distress should often have so great a fascination that men will cultivate a faculty for picking out every detail of life which will throw them into this state of isolation and fancied superiority. Such people are apt to value themselves on their position as judges, imagining that it is a kind of moral superiority which places them on the bench. And they have popular opinion in their

favour on this point. But they have the condemnation of the New Testament and of our Lord Himself. For the title which He applies to the supreme point of evil is the Devil—that is to say, the Accuser. And anyone whose mind is preoccupied with accusations, and whose conversation is mainly concerned with accusations, works himself into exactly the state of self-torture and of hostility to his fellows which the "outer darkness" implies. His god, if he retains one, is an angry, not to say querulous, Deity, who is the very antithesis of the Father Whom Christ revealed. Untold harm has been done by substituting the Indignation Meeting for the Day of Humiliation and Prayer, and no more fatal mistake can be made in politics than to adopt the broad and easy way of denunciation instead of the hard and uphill path of enthusiasm.

The parable, however, points out that this state can be approached from various sides. The guest in this particular parable does not object to the feast. He comes to it. But he is not going to be confused with the other guests. In his refusal to be dressed as they are there is the same pride which made Napoleon insist that everyone who took part in any great function should be arrayed in full uniform, while he himself was arrayed in plain black. The man's failure to give a reason shews that he did not like to avow it, but felt that it was a poor one. The determination to insist on being one's self, and not just a member of a company, soon slips into a position of hostility, especially if the man's supposed superiority fails to be appreciated. It is to be observed here that this anti-social attitude, this tendency to keep oneself to oneself, greatly as it has been vaunted, is characterized by its results. Those who know anything of the plentiful examples of this frame of mind which are to be found in towns know how often it results, not in a cold indifference to others, but in a detestation of them. I believe it to be true, indeed, that where that isolation is made complete, as in cases of solitary confinement, actual lunacy supervenes. But short of that, anyone who has a fair acquaintance with the streets of large towns knows the misanthropic attitude of the person who "keeps himself to himself" only too well. The truth is that our choice does not lie between being social or unsocial, but between being social and anti-social. If, as I believe, St. Matthew is the Church gospel—*i.e.*, that one of the Synoptics which was written for a settled Christian community—the fact that the phrase about the Outer Darkness is peculiar to St. Matthew*

* There is, however, the Lucan phrase (xi. 34), "if thy whole body be full of darkness" (*cf.* St. Matthew vi. 23), which seems to imply the explanation afforded by the fuller Outer Darkness wherein, etc.

has a grave significance. For Christianity is essentially a social religion. It is not easy to make it so. We are all, God forgive us, difficult enough. And many of us tend to avoid the difficulty by adopting the Christian creed instead of allowing ourselves to be adopted by the Church.

Hence comes the necessity for the warning of Matt. viii. 12. There are plenty of people willing to come and enjoy the services but unwilling to be drawn into the life of the Church, people who regard themselves as Christians but want to attend rather than belong to a Church. This would seem to be one of the reasons why the danger is brought right home in the saying "The children of the kingdom shall be cast into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." No doubt there is another and an important avenue indicated in this passage. That tendency to look down on the world outside, which was so well exemplified in the Jewish attitude to the Gentiles, came very near to destroying the missionary work of the Church, and thereby rendering it faithless to and condemned by our Lord. Nor are examples wanting of the unlovely and un-Christian temper of little groups which pride themselves on a monopoly of the light, but live in an atmosphere of fierce gloom.

The third example of the use of the phrase in St. Matthew (xx. 30) occurs in the parable of the Unprofitable Servant. I cannot refrain from transcribing John MacMurray's comment in his *Reason and Emotion* (p. 143): "You can refuse to traffic with men and women in the sterling gold of your own precious life. Like the man in the parable, you may wrap up your capital in a clean handkerchief and bury it, for fear of the risks of trading with it in a world where even banks go bankrupt. You may hope so to render it up at last and say: 'I have it safe: see how clean my soul is, unspotted from the earth.' And the judge will say: 'Take it from him, and cast him into outer darkness.' If you choose security you will have your reward: you may gain the whole world. You may escape all the dangers of reality. All but one. In the long run—and for those of us who are fortunate it comes before the hour of death—a voice will say: 'Thou fool. This day thy soul shall be required of thee. Then whose will those things be? For what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?'" This important and valuable comment indicates yet another avenue. But it joins with that disinclination to work with others—not only with the adventurous but the ordinary worker—which the parable also indicates, the danger of which we have been speaking.

As Professor MacMurray points out, present experience has its eschatological significance. We may be pulled up in

time; that is why warning is given. But, if we are to draw right inference from present experience, we must learn to view it in the right way. That is why so correct and authoritative an analysis is valuable, and might be so useful, if it were duly regarded. But it has not been treated with due respect. The warning has simply been treated as a bit of Oriental imagery. But even Oriental imagery is an attempt to state something. And here is a statement which is not a mere piling up of figures, but a clear statement about ethics, and, indeed, a statement of what our Lord came to save us from. Isolation, pessimism, harping on grievances, hatred—these are indicated, one by one, as characteristic of the pit from which He comes to rescue us. But even He cannot rescue us until we learn that they are sins. If further proof that they are sins were needed, it would be provided by the plain truth that to stand apart from one's fellows, to view them in their darkest aspect, to hold on to our real or fancied wrongs, and to cherish vindictiveness are each and all destructive of that love which is the first and last requirement of Christian duty, as it is also the fundamental characteristic of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. They are indeed "the worm that dieth not and the fire that is not quenched," and those of us who have suffered from them most know that no amount of common sense, no degree of determination to have done with them, will cut them short. Only the action of the Saviour can quench those fires and pluck us out of that pit. Only He can overcome these anti-social tendencies, and so make for us that At-one-ment with man, as well as with God, which we so sorely need. The irresistible result of these evils, the compulsion with which some of us are so sadly familiar, is well expressed by that word "cast." All things conspire and combine against us, and only He who is greater than all can save us from that living death; which, as experience sadly shows, may become our chosen and appropriate condition.

R. O. P. TAYLOR.

THE SPANISH CHURCH UNDER THE MOORS*

SPAIN, which at the present moment is engaged in so significant a struggle, and upon whom the eyes of the whole world are now anxiously bent, has always been, more violently perhaps than

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(Literature: DOZY, *Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne*; COUNT W. W. v. BAUDISSIN, *Eulogius u. Alvar.*)

any other country, the material for conflicting and successive cultures, each of which was outstanding and aggressive and each of which she has in some sense absorbed and made part of her own fascinating and slightly enigmatic personality. The most strenuously opposed tendencies have expressed themselves in her literature and art, and have left memorials to themselves in her culture. If all nations are, of course, composites, the results of successive and violent shakings of the bottle, it may with truth be said of Spain that in tracing her evolution we can discern with unusual clarity the various elements which compose the whole, and can trace with ease the influences which have worked upon her. The reason for this is probably that the forces which dominated Spain in successive ages possessed certain exceedingly distinctive and contrasting characteristics at the periods when those forces imposed themselves upon her.

When investigating the period in the history of the Spanish Church with which it is proposed in the following pages to deal, one is struck by the irony of the fact that, while then the Christians, as we shall see, felt themselves oppressed by—and certainly were subject to—Moorish overlordship administered by rulers of great splendour, and knew themselves to be swamped by the magnificence of an arrogantly successful rival religion: while all this was *then* the case, *now* the self-same Church is, with one voice and all too few dissentient murmurs, calling upon the descendants of those Moors as saviours of the Christian faith, as patriots and deliverers of Spain! The whirligig of time has surely never brought in stranger revenges than this, nor has Spain's proverbial pride sunk lower than at the present period.

Perhaps Spain has never been deeply enough Christian. In this she is, alas, far from unique. But we may perhaps learn from a study, however slight, of the historical background of her Christianity much that may throw light upon her present state.

Before Constantine raised Christianity to the position of a state religion Spain was almost entirely pagan, and her Christianization did not go very deep. The last decades of her history as a Roman province were distinctly times of religious and moral deterioration. The Gallican présbyter Salvianus (d. 484) says in his work, *De Gubernatione Dei*, in reference to Spain, that the moral decay there was even greater than that of Gaul. Hence the barbarian invasion was regarded by many churchmen as a Divine judgment on the Roman empire. Many Spaniards, says Orosius of Torraco (d. after 417), preferred to be poor but free under the barbarians than to be suffocated

under the Romans (*Historiarum*, II., VII., *adv. paganos*). In the year 409 hordes of Vandals, Alani, and Suevi entered the peninsula and "ravaged with equal fury the cities and the open country." They were followed in 414, under Atalphus, by the Arian West-Goths. Atalphus' second successor, Walis, who conducted a treaty with the Roman emperor Honorius, put himself at the head of his Goths and in the year 419 drove the Alani to Aquitania. The Suevi, however, were only finally crushed by Theodoric II. in 456. From now on the Suevi were confined within the limits of Galicia and Lusitania, and Spain, which Theodoric first conquered for the Romans, became an independent West-Gothic realm. The Vandals, together with the insignificant remnants of the Alani, had quitted the country for Africa by 429.

Because of these violent changes, pagan, Arian and Catholic elements were jumbled in wild confusion in Spain, and Arian as well as pagan religious features were preserved long after the Catholic faith was accepted as the religion established by law. At first the Suevi, till then heathen, were converted to Catholicism under their king, Rechiar (448), but later turned Arian. However, they became Catholics again under King Tarrarich, who was influenced by the saintly Martin of Dumium, and was also guided to take this step by his experience at the miraculous grave of Martin of Tours, where he received an answer to a prayer. This acknowledgment of the Catholic faith as the established religion of the Suevi was then confirmed by the Synod of Bracara in the year 561.

Arianism continued longer among the Goths. Eurich (466-493), the successor of Theodoric II., even persecuted the Catholics. King Recared, however, professed the Orthodox faith together with his people in the year 587. When the third Council of Toledo confirmed it in 589, several eminent persons under the direction of Sunna, the Bishop of Emerita, conspired against the king to dethrone him and re-introduce Arianism; their purpose, however, was discovered and brought to nought. But in spite of this, it was a long while before Catholicism gained a firm footing in Spain. Arian tendencies remained long in vogue, and even paganism continued for a considerable time.

The West-Gothic, or Visigothic, kingdom of Spain, founded by Walis, lasted for nearly three centuries, from 418 to 711, when it fell before the Arab, or Saracen, invasion.

In 710 a little band of Saracens landed unopposed at Gibraltar, returned in safety, and urged their brethren to cross the straits and take possession of Spain. In the following year they entered the country, and under the leadership of Musa Ibn-Nosair, the governor of Africa, conquered the greatest part

of the peninsula. The decaying structure of the kingdom of the Goths fell to pieces with amazing ease and rapidity. With the exception of some brave bands under the guidance of Pelagius, who maintained their freedom in the mountainous districts of the north, no vigorous resistance was attempted by the enervated Visigoths. St. Bonifacius could write without exaggeration to King Ethelbald (*Epistolæ St. Bonifacii*, 72) that Spain was defeated "because she has turned away from God to unholiness."

At first the conquerors treated the inhabitants mildly. The invasion undoubtedly brought with it considerable bloodshed and destruction of property, but all who submitted to the Arabs were allowed to retain their own laws and customs. The cultivation of the fields was left to the natives, and the overthrow of the privileged classes gave rise to a system of small holdings or properties, which was one of the causes of the flourishing condition of agriculture under Arab rule. Yet from the beginning the taxing conditions pressed heavily upon the Christians. Beside the land-tax they had to pay a poll-tax, which varied according to the class to which they belonged. Converts to Islam were exempt from this tax.

For the regulation of civic affairs the Christians were allowed to have their own officials. The first one was the Count of Cordova. In fact, it seems that this was the only countship which continued from the time of the West-Goths, and that the Christians of Cordova, the capital, were thus in a privileged position in this as in other respects.

Apart from the counts of Cordova, the Christians had two more high functionaries: the *publicanus*, or *exceptor*, who assessed the poll-tax, and the *censor*, or judge. Offences against the Muslim religion, however, such as using insulting words against the Prophet, and proselytizing, were dealt with by the *khadi*, the Mohammedan judge. Apart from this the Christians in Spain enjoyed more freedom than in other countries under Arab rule. As long as the taxes were paid and Mohammedanism was not reviled, they might practise their religion undisturbed. We have no more detailed knowledge of their position until the ninth century; yet it is almost certain that before that period it was even more tolerable. We do not read, for instance, that the Christians in Spain had to dress differently from the Arabs. Tonsured monks in their woollen habits, and priests, were allowed to be seen in public in their characteristic attire, as were the nuns in their purple or black veils. Bells called the Christians to church and proclaimed the hours of prayer. The dead, too, might be buried according to Christian custom.

At the conquest many churches were destroyed and others were turned into mosques, and the splendour of the great mosque at Cordova, with its slender minarets, courts full of sweet-smelling flowers and magnificent halls, must have saddened the Christians, when they thought of their ancient cathedral which had once stood upon the same site. They were, however, permitted to rebuild the other churches in Cordova, and even to build new ones. Mass was celebrated, with the burning of incense, Scripture lessons and sermon. The festivals were observed according to custom: the bishops collected the tertiary contributions in aid of the building of churches and for poor relief. The greatest number of Christians were in Cordova, and they possessed more churches there than elsewhere, as the Emirs endeavoured to concentrate all splendour, even that of Christian architecture, in the capital of their kingdom, and, ignoring the Metropolitan seat of Toledo and Seville, summoned Church Councils there. The clergy lived together in buildings attached to their churches. The monasteries lay mostly in lonely mountainous districts: thus the monastery Tabanos was situated between steep mountain and thick forest: the monastery of St. Zoili at Marmilata, north of Cordova, in the midst of solitary mountains; and the environs of the monastery of St. Salvatoris at the foot of the Pinna Mellaria and that of SS. Justus and Pastor were similarly remote. Some monasteries, like those of Tabanos, Pinna Mellaria and Eutoclara, contained nuns as well as monks. The cells of the nuns in such monasteries were separated from those of the monks by high walls, and the nuns never left their quarters. The whole monastery was under the control of the abbot; when something had to be done for the brothers or for strangers, the abbess would appear, but only at the window. The nuns did not always live in communities, as even according to earlier decisions of Spanish synods the *virgines sacræ* were allowed to remain in their homes or stay in the house of a distinguished cleric, but they had to devote themselves entirely to prayer and good works.

In addition to these religious amenities, the Christians were in no way proscribed or disturbed in their secular occupations and pleasures; there are many instances of rich Christian noblemen and others who engaged in knightly sports or carried on extensive commercial ventures.

Characteristically, the Christians living among the Arabs were called "*Mosarabs*" (Mustarobin)—*i.e.*, "Would-be Arabs." At first they endured the new conditions without complaint; the clergy also adapted themselves to the situation, and the lower ranks of ecclesiastics scarcely felt themselves interfered

with. Some priests even occupied certain positions at Court and served as interpreters. However, even before the bitter struggles between the two religions began—after the accession of Abdarrahman II., in the year 822, and especially since 850—individual voices of deep hatred against their Mohammedan rulers were heard among Christians. Occasions of real friction were inevitable. Considering the religious condition of the masses of the people, who were in many cases only very partially Christianized, it is scarcely to be wondered at that many of them, in order to be exempt from the poll-tax, as well as numerous slaves, in order to be enfranchised, turned Mohammedan. Criminals tried to escape punishment by open apostasy. Often the renegades soon regretted their action, but any return to the Church meant death, and thus a great mass of so-called "secret Christians" (*Christiani occulti*) came into being who provided most of the fermentative stuff for the general dissatisfaction of the subjected people. The question here arises whether the clergy simply looked on at the defection of these renegades as though their desertion to the ranks of the enemy were no concern of their fathers-in-God. Such a position would appear incredible did we not know of the extreme ignorance and general low standard of the rank and file of the clergy, which made them the tools of the bishops and dignitaries, who were divided in their attitude to the new situation.

Under the Goths the bishops attained great power in the State, and in their own interest they vigorously prevented the coming into being of a hereditary monarchy. But the invasion of the Arabs had suddenly changed all this. One privilege after another was taken away from them. The appointment of bishops became a chief source of strife. The Gothic kings had the right to summon councils and to appoint bishops, and it frequently happened—as for instance under the Merovingians—that high ecclesiastical offices were either sold or given as presents to their adherents. These rights reverted in the north to the Asturian kings, and in the south to the Arab rulers. The result was that he who put himself most pliably into the service of the Mohammedans was given the first place.

In relation to Rome the Spanish bishops during the Arab rule took an independent stand. That this was so is borne out, for instance, by events at the time of the Adoptionist controversies towards the end of the eighth century. As against the ultra-Roman conception of Migetius, before he fell into heresy, that alone in Rome "is the power of God, where Christ dwells," and that Rome is "the new Jerusalem that came down from heaven," Bishop Elipandus remarks in a letter: "We believe that not only in regard to Rome did the Lord say

to Peter, 'On this rock will I build my Church,' but of the whole Catholic Church which is spread in peace over the whole world. . . . Thinkest thou that Rome is that City of God where 'nothing unclean or he that maketh an abomination and a lie' ever enters? Why, then, was Libertius, a priest of that Church, condemned for heresy? And why did St. Gregory declare that there were so many criminals in Rome? In fact, St. Peter himself designates the Church of Rome by the name 'Babylon': 'She (the Church) that is in Babylon . . . salutes you'! (1 Pet. v. 13)." And in a letter written in the year 799 —*i.e.*, some years after the death of Pope Hadrian and the accession of Leo III., Elipandus had to confess that he did not even know the name of the ruling Pope: he asks Felix of Urgellis: "Do tell me who sits on the Roman see"!

The evil influence of the Mohammedan rule was felt particularly in the sphere of education. It was only with great difficulty that the Roman clergy had originally imparted to the semi-barbarous West-Goths some outer polish of culture, and only very gradually that a freer cultural life began to unfold itself among the two united races. Thus, Isidore of Seville, who died in 636 (the ornament of the Catholic Church, as the eighth Toledo Council called him), wrote his *Etymologies*, a diligent compendium of all the knowledge of the time. But the invasion of the Arabs checked this happy beginning. Isidore's works, containing among others an apologia for Christianity, addressed to Jews, remained for a long time the zenith of Christian literature in Spain, and were almost the single source from which the knowledge of classical and Christian antiquity was drawn. Intercourse with the rest of Christendom was almost entirely cut off; the disturbances within took away all inclination for study. Whilst at the mosques the *ulama* and the *fukaha* were zealously engaged with the study of the Koran and the Sunna (tradition), and in connection with the mosques many schools were erected, the means for the education of the Christian clergy were extremely slender. It is true that the ordinands were often trained in the schools which had been in existence since the time of the Goths and which were connected with the Church colleges, and that young men, even when not intending to enter monastic orders, were also frequently educated in monasteries; but they must have been restricted to a very small range of material for their instruction. Collections of the books of the Holy Scripture, called "libraries," were very rare. Alvarus, a layman of Jewish origin, celebrated in verse such a *bibliotheca* of a certain Leuvigild.

The more educated clergy gathered about them bands of studious young men; one magnet for these seekers after know-

ledge was the Abbot Sperandeo of Cordova. But many prospective ordinands were, through their inability to join the ranks of their more fortunate compatriots, practically debarred from acquiring the essential elements of a theological education.

Latin, the medium of Christian culture, was almost forgotten. Young Christian men, who emulated the Arabs in elegant behaviour as in fashionable costume, endeavoured to be their equals also in familiarity with Arabic literature, rhetoric and culture. But "Who, I ask," laments the aforementioned Alvarus, "will be found among the young Christians of to-day who would be capable of reading the Latin writings of any scholar? Who is enflamed by love for the words of the Evangelists, Apostles and Prophets? The beauty of Church literature they know not, and the streams of the Church which flow out of Paradise they despise. One can scarcely find in a Christian congregation one among a thousand who could write a Latin letter to a friend, but there are plenty who know how to explain in learned phrases the gush of Arabic declamation." But even among the clergy a proper knowledge of Latin was rare. Of Bishop Claudius of Turin (d. 840), who was of Spanish origin and who received his first education in Spain, we hear that his opponents, Jonas and Dungal, mocked him because of his barbaric Latin. Similarly the abbot Samson of Cordova makes fun of the record of the Council's resolution of the year 862: "Should one look there for Latinity—he will be greatly disappointed; for orthography—he will discover that it does not exist." Unfortunately for his irony, this critic subsequently perpetrates several errors himself!

Many Christians were not at all dismayed by this decay of Christian education. Some went so far in their assimilation with the Arabs as to accept circumcision, even when they did not actually turn Mohammedan. But those who took their Christianity more seriously must have felt the decline of Christian culture acutely, especially when they compared their condition with the high standard manifested in the court of the emirs at Cordova. For the star Suhail, to whose magic powers the Arabs ascribed the splendour of their kingdoms, seemed to have caused its red light to shine more brightly over Spain than over any other climes where the Mueddins proclaimed the name of the Prophet. At the court of Abdarrahman I., gatherings took place where the guests, joined by the highly educated Prince Hisham, competed with one another in the declamation of poems and eulogistic songs by famous poets and singers.

In comparison with such melody-making and joyousness in Alcasar, the magnificent court of the Emir, and in the palaces

of the Mohammedan notables, the psalm-singing of the priests in the church choirs sounded but dull and sad. *There* the songs resounded between walls full of colour and elaborately adorned with gold; *here* they died away in desolate halls, the most beautiful ornaments of which had been destroyed by the conquerors. Only rarely could the Christians build new churches, and this, even, was made possible only by the favour of the unbelievers; but to the praise of Allah's prophet ever new minarets in elegant forms were continually being erected; for the enjoyment of his adherents one gorgeous castle after another was built. And all this splendour was centred in Cordova, the capital. "The luminous beauty of the world, the young exalted city, proud of the power of her warriors, famous by reason of her abounding delights, brilliant in her manifold possessions, overflowing by the seven rivers of wisdom"—thus sings of Cordova's fame the nun Hroswitha in the lonely cells of far-away Gnadersheim, in Saxony. All this rising greatness must have reminded the Christians again and again that their own star sank; and although they were not allowed to enter the mosques, yet everything that they saw made them conscious of the fact that within those mosques each Friday the banners were raised which symbolized the victory of Islam over the Gospel.

The longer this state of bondage lasted the more oppressive it became to the Christians; the longer the Arabs saw the continuance of their dominion the more they came to consider themselves as the only legitimate masters of the land. In time past Abdarrahman had planted in the luxurious gardens of his villa Rusafa a palm, in memory of his sadly missed native Syria, and addressed it thus:

Thou, O Palm, art a stranger,
As I am in this land;
Art a stranger here in the West,
Far from thy home strand.

But this nostalgia soon gave place to a new attitude. The palm-tree took root and became the mother of many more; Syria was forgotten and Spain became Syria to the aliens. They now felt themselves at home in the strange land and paid no attention to the claims of the native Christian population. Though the Arab lords did not provocatively disturb or oppose the religious practices of the Christians, yet, by relentlessly carrying out the letter of the law, they incited them to resistance against Islam, not in the hope of triumphing over their Mohammedan enemies—the Christians were unarmed—but in the desperate longing for martyrdom which now became a cult. The first of these martyrs was provoked to speak against Mohammed by the perfidious behaviour of a Muslim, but his

death awakened in many others an intense desire to gain the crown of martyrdom by voluntary sacrifice. And the most ardent spirits of this anti-Mohammedan movement were Eulogius and his friend, the above-mentioned Christian of Jewish origin, Peter Alvarus.

PAUL P. LEVERTOFF.

MISCELLANEA

THE REFORMATION, THE MASS AND THE PRIESTHOOD

SINCE writing the letter in the October number of THEOLOGY, I have read the Rev. H. Beevor's article on my book in the September number of THEOLOGY. I welcome his criticisms of errors in orthography, etc., and I will see that these are duly noted in my second volume, now in active preparation. I am sorry I put "Mr. Harris" instead of "Dr. Harris," but I have not thought it worth while to complain that Dr. Cross refers to me, in THEOLOGY itself, as "Mr. Messenger"!

In general, Mr. Beevor's points are the same as those set forth in the review printed in the *Church Times* for July 17, under the complimentary heading, "Half-baked History," and I cannot help wondering whether the two reviews are not written by the same pen. I answered some of the points raised in the *Church Times* review in letters which appeared in that paper on July 24 and 31, and I refer Mr. Beevor to these. His other points will be duly dealt with in my second volume. In the meantime, I beg leave to make the following comments on his article:

1. Although Luther himself did not use the words "*Accipe Spiritum Sanctum*" in his own ordination rite, the words do occur in the Lutheran ordination rite of Hesse, as I point out in my book (p. 155), and there is no reason to suppose that Bucer objected to them.

2. My statement as to Gairdner's view of the Ten Articles is based upon his sentence: "How the Ten Articles for English use were elaborated out of the Sixteen Articles of Wittenburg we cannot trace in detail . . ." (*Lollardy*, ii., p. 377), and not upon the sentence quoted by Mr. Beevor. I fairly set forth Gairdner's own view at the top of p. 247.

3. I note that Mr. Beevor is much more careful than Dr. Cross in his remarks concerning the rubric for the Communion of the Sick. Dr. Cross said the rubric is "taken straight from the *Sarum Manual*"; Mr. Beevor merely claims that it is "based on a direction" in it.

4. I note Mr. Beevor's admission that "there is a close relation between the Anglican rite of ordination and the draft contained in Bucer's work." But why does he still think it possible that Bucer's rite was later than 1550? He adduces no evidence, and does not discuss mine.

5. I also note his admission that "it can be proved from their writings that Cranmer and other individual Reformers held defective views concerning the Sacrament." This surely explains the significance of the ambiguous language which Mr. Beevor allows to be present in the Anglican Communion Service.

6. I also note Mr. Beevor's statement that "the essence of the Christian ministry is to be found in the power to preach the Word and to dispense the Sacraments," and his further statement that "a belief that the Apostles thought of themselves as primarily and essentially sacrificing priests finds no support in the pages of the New Testament." In other words, Mr. Beevor rejects the Catholic conception of the priesthood, as defined at Trent, and gives a definition of his office which would

be accepted by any Free Church minister. I am content to allow that a "ministry of the Word and the Sacraments" is really contemplated by the American Ordinal, and that if the Christian ministry consisted of that and nothing more, the Anglican Ordinal would suffice to confer it.

7. I now come to a point on which Mr. Beevor lays much stress. He repeats the offence of the *Church Times* by quoting half a sentence of mine away from its context, to the effect that "the Church never makes use of the term 'exhibited' in her own exposition of the doctrine of the Real Presence," and by so doing gives this statement a meaning it was not intended to have. It occurs in my chapter on the Council of Trent, and follows a translation of the Council's decrees on the Real Presence. Mr. Beevor does not even quote the complete sentence, for I continue: "the term only occurs in the eighth canon, which is condemning a statement made by the Reformers" (p. 210). That should have made it quite plain that I was referring to the Council of Trent. It was not in my mind to say that the term had never been used by any Catholic writer. Mr. Beevor, like the *Church Times* reviewer, says it is used twice by St. Thomas Aquinas, and he now adds that it is also used on p. 76 of the Cologne *Enchiridion*. He may be interested to know that it occurs also on pp. 49 and 54 of the same work. The statement on p. 49 is particularly illuminating: "Eatenus hoc sacramentum cæteris sacramentis . . . majus et excellentius est, quod in aliis, elementum seu exterior species nullam substantialem mutationem recipit. Neque enim aqua baptismatis, aut oleum charismatis consecrata, in aliam naturam mutantur, neque Spiritus Sanctus . . . in eisdem elementis essentialiter *continetur*, quamvis credentibus in mysterio *exhibeatur* et detur. At solum sacramentum panis et vini, potentia verbi divini, ita mutatur ut substantialiter non sit quod ante fuerat . . ." (italics mine). Is it not clear from this that the term "exhibited" is not, of itself, adequate to express the Catholic doctrine of the Real Objective Presence? Mr. Beevor surely does not think that when Bucer says that, in the Eucharist, "the Body of the Lord, that is, the communion of the Lord, is exhibited and given to faith," or again, that "the bread and wine be signs exhibitive, that is to say, such signs as do give the things signified" (see p. 163 of my work), he means the same as St. Thomas Aquinas when the latter says that "Christ in this sacrament exhibits to us his flesh in an invisible manner"? Is there no significance in the fact that, whereas the 1530 form of the Augsburg Confession said that "the Body and Blood of Christ are really present and are distributed to those who eat in the Lord's Supper," the 1540 version, due to Melanchthon, says merely that "Together with the bread and wine, the Body and Blood of Christ are really *exhibited* to those who eat in the Lord's Supper"? (See pp. 122-3.) And if Lutheran and Bucerian theologians agreed in signing the Concord of Wittenberg in May, 1536, with its statement that "the Body and Blood of Christ are really and substantially present, *exhibited* and received with the bread and wine" (p. 137), is it not clear that this formula is a deliberately vague and ambiguous one? And if Melanchthon similarly says in the Wittenberg Articles, drawn up with Luther's approval for transmission to England in this same year 1536, that "corpus et sanguis Domini vere, substantialiter et realiter adsint sub speciebus paniset vini, et sub eisdem speciebus vere et corporaliter exhibeantur et distribuantur omnibus illis qui sacramentum accipiunt," is it not clear that this statement is similarly capable of different meanings?

Melanchthon certainly did not hold the same doctrine as Luther on the subject! And in turn, the English Article of 1536, which is based on the Wittenberg Article, says that "under the form and figure of bread and wine" (the Wittenberg Article had "sub speciebus") the Body and Blood of Christ are "corporally, really, and in the very substance exhibited, distributed and received unto and of all them which receive the said sacrament." Whatever this English article teaches, it certainly does not teach Transubstantiation! Rather, like the Continental formulæ, it would seem to be deliberately ambiguous. And that is all I claim on p. 249 of my work.

8. One last word. Like the *Church Times* review, Mr. Beevor displays a lamentable misunderstanding of the force of a *Nihil Obstat*. This phrase simply means that, in the judgment of the censor, there is nothing in the book contrary to faith or morals. A book may be extremely silly, and a censor may disagree with its statements or conclusions, but unless it is against Catholic faith or morals, he is bound to give it his *Nihil Obstat*.

E. C. MESSENGER.

CORRESPONDENCE

DR. MESSENGER AND ANGLICAN ORDERS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY

DEAR SIR,

A Roman Catholic who has some understanding of the Church of England is loath to discuss Anglican Orders because he knows that such discussion is unprofitable. The question of their validity is bound up with the doctrine of the Church's intention, and it is scarcely possible to discuss the nature of the Church's intention apart from the more fundamental question of the nature and authority of the Church itself. Until unity of belief is reached on the latter point the divergence about Anglican Orders is better left as a sadly accepted but undiscussed fact.

If, however, such discussion is undertaken, it must be entered upon with a strong sense of responsibility and with the most patient endeavour to understand the whole position as the other side sees it. It is because I feel that in this matter THEOLOGY has not, perhaps, been altogether true to its own high standard that I venture to make some comments on the Rev. Humphrey Beevor's review-article in your September number on Dr. Messenger's book, *The Reformation, the Mass and the Priesthood*.

I have not yet read Dr. Messenger's book, nor is it for me to defend him against the charge of lack of solid scholarship which Fr. Beevor brings against him. Yet the review-article brought to my mind the proverb about people who live in glass houses. For has not Fr. Beevor himself failed to grasp the doctrine of intention which is a primary element in our inability to recognize Anglican Orders as valid; and since a clear understanding of this doctrine is fundamental to the whole question, is not the greater part of his criticism of Dr. Messenger vitiated by his failure to do so?

May I, therefore, in the interests of a true understanding of the things that divide us, attempt to justify my allegation? Towards the end of

his article Fr. Beevor writes: "To confer a Sacrament with the right intention, it is necessary for the Minister, using the appropriate Form and Matter, to have the intention of doing what the true Church instituted by Christ does. Provided he has this intention, erroneous views concerning the nature of the Sacrament which he administers do not affect its validity." He then goes on to quote Dr. Adrian Fortescue, who says: "People who are not theologians never seem to understand how little *intention* is wanted for a sacrament. . . . The 'implicit intention of doing what Christ instituted' means so vague and small a thing that one can hardly help having it—unless one deliberately excludes it. At the time when everyone was talking about Anglican Orders, numbers of Catholics confused *intention* with *faith*. Faith is not wanted. It is heresy to say that it is. . . . A man may have utterly wrong, heretical, and blasphemous views about a sacrament and yet confer or receive it quite validly." Fr. Beevor then comments: "Dr. Messenger has added himself to the 'numbers of Catholics' guilty of this confusion. But it is only fair to allow that in so doing he has followed Leo XIII.'s example."

The fact that his own reading of the doctrine of intention drove him to accuse not only Dr. Messenger, but Leo XIII. (and presumably his theological advisers also) of not knowing the difference between faith and intention did not apparently cause Fr. Beevor to re-examine that reading. Yet in the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* Leo XIII. clearly and carefully distinguishes two aspects of sacramental intention: that which is by its nature internal, about which the Church does not judge; and that which is manifested externally, about which the Church is bound to judge.

If a person rightly and seriously makes use of the form and matter prescribed by the Church, he is considered by the very fact to do what the Church does. His internal intention, that is, has no other external manifestation than the form and matter so prescribed; and this effectively expresses the Church's mind. But if the prescribed form or matter be changed, with the manifest intention of introducing another rite not approved by the Church and of rejecting what the Church teaches, then not only is the true intention lacking, but the existing intention is adverse to and destructive of the sacrament. The internal intention, that is, of the person using a new form or matter, not authorized by the Church, and rejecting what she teaches, has a new external manifestation which lacks the Church's authority and is contrary to her mind. A person making use of such a new form or matter does not therefore intend to do what the Church does.

Fr. Beevor does not seem to have seen that his own description of intention and that of Dr. Fortescue refers only to the internal intention, which is sufficient when a person who is a heretic or unbeliever, in using a sacrament, employs the due form and matter sanctioned by the Church. But Leo XIII. was not concerned with this aspect of intention, about which he says expressly that the Church does not judge. He was concerned with the external manifestation of intention, made through a rite (the Edwardine Ordinal) not approved (as we hold) by the Church and introduced with the manifest intention (as we hold) of rejecting what the Church does and what by the institution of Christ belongs to the nature of a sacrament. Hence Fr. Beevor's assertion that "nothing that Dr. Messenger can allege concerning the defective views of Cranmer and other Reformers concerning the Holy Sacrifice has the least bearing

on the question of the intention of the Ordinal" is true only of their internal intention when using the traditional Ordinal, but is very far from true of their externally manifested intention in compiling and using the new Ordinals. For in altering the traditional forms to which the Church had given her sanction they were removing the official expression of her mind and intention and substituting a new formula which expressed their own intention. If it could be proved that their own intention, thus externally manifested, coincided with that of the Church and was orthodox, then there would be ground for holding it to be a true intention capable of conferring a valid sacrament.

But it is precisely here that the admittedly defective views of the compilers of the Ordinal are of importance. "The Preface to the Ordinal," says Fr. Beevor, "makes it abundantly clear that the intention of its compilers was not to create a new 'Evangelical' ministry, nor merely to revive a form of ministry which supposedly had existed in apostolic days, but had since been lost to the Church. Their explicit intention was to 'continue' those Orders which had been in Christ's Church 'from the Apostles' time,' and not merely a ministry which they conceived to have existed *in* the Apostles' time." This is undoubtedly true provided the rider be added: Their explicit intention was to continue those Orders purged from certain elements which they regarded as later accretions forming no part of the teaching of the primitive Church.

In the eyes of Cranmer and the other compilers the Sacrifice of the Mass as traditionally taught by East and West alike, at the time of the Reformation, was such an accretion, and it can hardly be doubted that they intended to eliminate this element from the Prayer-Book conception of the ancient Orders which had been in Christ's Church from the Apostles' time. But the Church (so we hold) regards the sacrificial element as being so necessary to the Christian ministry that to eliminate it brings about an essential change in its character and makes it something other than that which Christ instituted. Consequently we feel bound to hold that the conception of episcopate and of priesthood in the Anglican Ordinal falls short of the Catholic conception, and the words bishop and priest, wherever they occur, are employed, to this extent at least, in a less than Catholic sense. Those, therefore, who use the Ordinal, whatever their internal intention may be, are not externally expressing what the Church does, but what the Reformers intended to do.

Father Beevor admits that though the successive Liturgies of the sixteenth century regard the Communion rite as in some sense a sacrifice, they never make explicit the precise nature of the sacrifice; they may imply a real sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ, or merely a commemorative offering "of praise and thanksgiving" in recollection of the full, perfect and sufficient Sacrifice once offered on the Cross. He urges, however, that the same ambiguity is found in the early liturgies, and maintains that the language of the Roman Canon itself is perfectly capable of being interpreted in accordance with virtualist or even receptionist views. But a primitive liturgy, sanctioned by traditional Catholic usage, which contains imperfectly articulate Eucharistic formulation is one thing, and a liturgy newly introduced, without (as we hold) the Church's approval from which traditional Eucharistic language has been deliberately removed, is another. The former is to be interpreted according to the developed Eucharistic doctrine of the Church, the latter can only be interpreted in the light of the opinions of those who compiled

it, for they had (as we hold) no authorization from the Church's authority for doing what they did.

Fr. Beevor says that "the doctrine that in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of Christ, really present beneath the forms of bread and wine, are offered in sacrifice to the Father, may be the rightful theological conclusion from the fact that the Church has historically regarded the Eucharist as the divinely instituted Sacrifice which has replaced all others; but this conclusion is nowhere made explicit in early liturgies. That it is likewise not made explicit in the Edwardine liturgies cannot be alleged to invalidate them." The Catholic Church (so we hold) has gradually formulated what Fr. Beevor calls a possibly rightful theological conclusion as the true teaching which our Lord has given to the Church. At the time of the Reformation this teaching was explicitly held by both East and West, and the traditional language of the Church's liturgies must be interpreted in the light of it. But the Reformers by their words and their actions denied or cast doubt upon this teaching, and their denials and doubts are reflected in the liturgies and Ordinals they compiled. Their exclusions, alterations and ambiguous language therefore carry a meaning very different from the imperfectly articulate language of the early liturgies.

It will be seen, I hope, from what has been said, that the whole question of the validity of Anglican Orders is closely bound up with the much wider question of ecclesiastical authority, and that in the last resort one's view in the former question is likely to depend upon one's beliefs concerning the latter. It has sometimes seemed to me that Anglicans assume far too easily that the publication of the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* was the result of ecclesiastical politics, and that Roman Catholic theologians, who study the question deeply, are embarrassed because they find it difficult to defend. This sometimes makes Anglicans impatient and consequently superficial in their treatment of the question. It is true that in the atmosphere of partisan controversy many bad arguments have been used—from the Nag's Head fable onwards; that is to be expected where both sides are in a state of belligerent hostility. But an increasing number on both sides are anxious that the atmosphere of hostility should give place to one of friendliness and understanding, and the first necessity for creating that atmosphere is a determination to understand the point of view of the other side and in this way to prepare the ground for unity. It is with this object in view, and not from any controversial motive, that I have written this letter.

Yours, etc.,
HENRY ST. JOHN, O.P.

BLACKFRIARS SCHOOL,
LAXTON, STAMFORD.
September 21, 1936.

WOMEN AND THE PRIESTHOOD

To the Editor of THEOLOGY

DEAR SIR,

I found Mr. Maycock's article on Canon Barry's *Relevance of the Church* most interesting, perhaps because I found in it so much to agree with. But I do quarrel with him on one count. I cannot think

he would wish to be offensive, yet offensive he certainly was to those Christian women who think in their hearts that they are "truly called . . . to the Order and Ministry of Priesthood." They do not desire any sacerdotal elevation (though I am not quite certain what that phrase exactly means), but they do desire to serve Christ and His Church in this office.

Mr. Maycock dismisses the idea of women priests as an irregular proposal. Some of us desire to see that proposal regularized because of our concern for the young men and women who, with a great desire for the truth, are finding the Church's methods of shewing it to them very far from consonant with the world they live in. They are told that "there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." But when they look at the Ministers of the Word and Sacraments they see something quite different.

Mr. Maycock holds by the unvarying content of doctrine and a periodic change in its expression—*i.e.*, in worship. It is in order that we may have this variety in the fullest measure that we desire to see both men and women at the Altar offering the Holy Sacrifice for and with the congregation.

H. C. ESCREET.

12, ASHLEY GARDENS, S.W. 1.
St. Matthew's Day, 1936.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Les Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales. XXIst year. No. 3. June, 1936.

This is the first notice in THEOLOGY of this useful and informative periodical, edited by the Benedictine Fathers of Mont César at Louvain. It appears every two months, and serves as an organ of the Liturgical Movement, consisting partly of studies in Liturgy and partly in their application to parochial teaching and methods. The June issue opens with a collection of, and commentary on, various pronouncements by the Holy See on the Liturgical Movement, shewing the interest and encouragement of the highest authorities since Pius X.'s famous *Motu proprio* thirty years ago.

The *Notes et documents*, which often provide the most illuminating section, contain a valuable discussion by Dom A. Francois, pioneer of the *Journées Liturgiques*, on "How to explain the Mass." But the concluding pages are the most interesting of all, a collection of evidence from Roman Catholic Missions, in Africa mainly, but also in the Far East, of attempts and successes in teaching native Christian congregations to sing the Mass corporately, to Gregorian music, and in Latin. The practical inconvenience of the last there is no effort to hide. "Evidently," comments the editor of the material, "vernacular liturgies would be desirable—all the missionaries are agreed on this." One suggestion is that "while waiting for a vernacular liturgy, the Oriental Rites actually in use might be adapted more easily for the Far East than the Western Rite." But the accounts given, even with this handicap, of what has proved possible in teaching the African to sing plainsong liturgical music are remarkable.

H. DE C.

In the July issue of the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* Father Lebon examines the Nicean-Constantinopolitan creeds, and his examination is at least as much by way of suggestion as by way of conclusion. Father Schepens gathers material for the history of the *Quicumque*. Its author he holds, with the late Dean Burn, to be St. Ambrose of Milan, a view now universally accepted. Father Burridge deals with the Immaculate Conception in the theology of mediæval learning, and in the course of his article he gathers together not a little curious information. Father Leman analyzes the points at issue in the nomination of Maréchal d'Estrées as ambassador to Rome in 1636. Father Pelzer summarizes his sense of the worth of an American essay or catalogue on manuscripts. Father Verhaegen shortly summarizes the three centuries retraced by members of the family of Spoelbergh at Louvain from 1563 to 1873.

R. H. M.

REVIEWS

MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT: A STUDY OF EARLY PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE "MODUS TENENDI PARLIAMENTUM." By M. V. Clarke, M.A., F.S.A., Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford. Pp. viii.+408. Longmans, 18s.

The premature death of Miss M. V. Clarke of Somerville has been felt as a grievous loss by many outside her own college, and among workers in the field of Irish history it leaves a gap at a point where trained observation, carefully gathered knowledge and real sympathy and understanding proceeding from devotion rather than partisanship were beginning to yield results of first-rate importance. Indeed, to many the chapters in the present volume which deal with the Irish Church and Taxation in the later Middle Ages and with the manuscripts, text and history of the Irish form of the *Modus tenendi Parliamentum* will seem of special note for that reason. The work itself, however, covers a much wider area of investigation and, since it was left in the form in which the author intended it to be published, may be taken to present conclusions which she would have been fully prepared to defend. And the reader of many vividly written pages will feel as he reads how much she would have enjoyed doing so. It is not easy for a writer engaged in teaching to resist the subconscious impulse to "modernize" the past, and there is such yielding in a certain number of cases in the present book. Miss Clarke may well be right in saying, for example, that "Wycliffe . . . had little originality" even in speaking of "the flood of books and pamphlets which he directed against the wealth and temporal power of the Church." But it is a long step forward to the conditions of modern life with the insidious influence of widely diffused misinformation when she adds in the notable chapter on "Ecclesiastical Consent to Taxation" that "until the concordat with the Papacy was reached at Bruges (1375) and the taint of heresy was definitely attached to Wycliffe's theory of dominion (1377) the laity were able to persuade themselves that the spoliation of the Church was not only expedient but just and godly." In an equally stimulating account of "Proctors in Parliament and Convocation" (with strictures *obiter* upon Walter Reynolds which would have satisfied even Dr. E. H. Pearce, his successor at Worcester, though not at Canterbury) she writes of the middle period of the reign of Edward II.:

"Reynolds' party consisted of Cæsarian prelates and clerks; following the lead of men in power at the court, they were indifferent to constitutional forms and ready to acquiesce in a policy of heavy taxation. Opposed to them were the great mass of the lower clergy, determined to defend their order against spoliation. They seem to have hoped for greater financial independence, if their assemblies were cut loose from Parliament; though they held firmly to the doctrine of consent, they took only the narrowest view of the consenting body and failed to recognise that the smaller the assembly, the easier it was to coerce it. Nothing is known of their leaders, but we may guess that direction came from the university men, doctors and masters, whose names and degrees appear frequently on proctorial returns. Between these extremes stood a middle party, which seems to have been led by Stapeldon of Exeter, with a certain backing from Cobham of Worcester and Simon of Ghent, Bishop of Salisbury. They understood the value of constitutional forms and, though they protested against irregularities either in letters of summons or in the composition of Parliament and Convocation, they were not merely obstructive, and freely admitted the paramount importance of Parliament."

What follows is too long to quote, though well worth reading. But what may be doubted is this activity of the "great mass of the lower clergy" with their unknown leaders, at least in default of much stronger evidence than is adduced. The difference between theory and practice is shewn in the contrast in the chapter on "Early Parliaments in England" between what the *Modus tenendi Parliamentum* endeavoured to present rather than perhaps to describe and what actually happened. And it is one of the points which it is most important to keep clear. Miss Clarke was amply justified in saying, as against some other moderns, that "a hard and fast theory of Parliament as a high court will explain neither the facts in the records nor the failure to apply a selective principle to their make-up and content," even if the last clause may sound a little odd. But to the keeper of records the note which she quotes (*via* Wake) from the "Great Register" of the Chapter of Worcester as to the Parliament of 1311, that "these proxies were not delivered, because the clergy is not bound to obey the king's call without the command of the archbishop," will hardly possess of necessity the high constitutional significance attached to it. So fully determined are most of our constitutional historians to prove the logical development of theory (even if an occasional lament has to be admitted in a footnote as to variation in practice) that they forget that in England, at any rate, the real reasons why things happen or do not happen, or grow in this way rather than that, are often hidden from their eyes because they are thinking all the time of matters judged to be more important. It is curious, again, that it did not seem curious to Miss Clarke that when she says in her chapter on "The Principle of Representation" that "we have it on the high authority of

Professor Tait that 'an elected chief magistrate, whether new mayor or old bailiff, must be assumed to have had for his necessary complement an elected body of twelve or twenty-four,'" the first example that she gives should be of a body not of twenty-four but of twenty-five in London at the beginning of the reign of King John, with a note from the *De Antiquis Legibus*: "In this year there were elected twenty-five of the more discreet citizens, sworn to counsel the city, together with the mayor." And we may venture to suspect that when in a useful discussion of "Representation and Consent" she says that "there is no indication in the early records of a clash of opinion where we would most expect to find it, that is, among the proctors in Convocation or in Parliament"—there are other reasons besides the assumption that "the idea of unanimity died hard."

CLAUDE JENKINS.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ST. AMBROSE. By F. Homes Dudden, D.D., Master of Pembroke College, Oxford. 2 vols. Clarendon Press. 35s.

Dr. Dudden's new work is a really great achievement. It fully corresponds to its title, "Life and Times." The historic background and contemporary conditions are described with a detail which must have involved years of patient study. The narrative is sometimes perhaps over-weighted, but often extraordinarily graphic. The bibliography may still be supplemented by that given in Palanque's *Saint Ambroise et l'Empire Romain*. But Dr. Dudden's historical presentation has no rival.

Particularly valuable is the elaborate Essay of 120 pages on Ambrose as a theologian. This is the most important part of the whole work. It is, of course, true that St. Ambrose has exerted enormous influence over Western religious thought, but it is also true, as Dr. Dudden says, that the importance of his influence as a theologian has not hitherto been adequately realized. "He has been thrown into the shade by Augustine. The lesser genius has been absorbed by the greater."

Förster, in his *Ambrosius Bischof von Mailand*, impressed upon his readers long ago the importance of Ambrose as a theologian, by dividing his subject into two parts, assigning 85 pages to him as Bishop, and 180 pages to him as a teacher of the Church. The proportion is suggestive. Ambrose's influence on Western thought is all the more remarkable because he had received no systematic theological education. "I began to teach," he says, "when I myself had not yet learnt," a self-estimate which adds peculiar interest to Augustine's

well-known picture of Ambrose absorbed in study, while the young African paused in his presence for a few moments and then without a word withdrew. The Bishop's theological learning was acquired, as Dr. Dudden says, during scanty hours, "snatched from the business of administering a great diocese, and of conducting important affairs of Church and State." How, under such circumstances, he managed to develop into a highly competent theologian is indeed a marvel. He was a good Greek scholar, but not a speculative genius. He was a lawyer, yet in spite of his legalism he was a mystic.

His teaching on the Holy Trinity and on the Incarnation is remarkable for its definiteness. Dr. Dudden is impressed by the clearness with which Ambrose avoided opposing errors, rejecting on the one hand the Sabellian theory that the Three Persons are merely three different manifestations of one Divine Being, and rejecting Tritheism on the other hand, insisting that though the Persons are distinct, They are not separate or separable.

On the doctrine of Redemption, says Dr. Dudden, "in some passages Ambrose (after the manner of the Eastern theologians) draws attention to the saving efficacy of the whole incarnate life of Christ, as a revelation of Divine truth, and as an example for imitation. In general, however, he indicates the Death, or the Blood, or the Cross of Christ as the means whereby the world's salvation was wrought." He explains the Death of Christ as a Sacrifice to the Father, a propitiation which manifested not only the love of the Son who gave Himself, but also the love of the Father who gave the Son.

Of deep importance is Ambrose's teaching, following the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the offering made on earth is continued in Heaven. There Christ the High Priest intercedes for mankind by offering His death for all; that is, by presenting to the Father His Manhood which for our sake has suffered and passed through death. Quoting what Ambrose actually said, he taught that "a priest must offer something, and in accordance with the Law enter into the holy places by means of blood. Therefore . . . it was needful for this Priest to enter into the supreme Holy of Holies in Heaven by means of His own Blood, that the offering for our sins might be for ever." The Redemptive Sacrifice is that which Christ the eternal Priest is continually pleading in Heaven.

Before any estimate is formed of the Eucharistic teaching of St. Ambrose, the time-honoured critical problem has to be faced, whether the treatise *De Sacramentis* was written by him, as well as the treatise *De Mysteriis*. Dr. Dudden, of course, notes that the *De Sacramentis* "embodies much of the contents

of *De Mysteriis*"; and that the Eucharistic teaching of the former is "much more ample" than that of the latter. It is, he says, "conceivable that the *De Sacramentis* is an authentic work of Ambrose which was cut down and utilized by Ambrose himself as the basis of his *De Mysteriis*." But he considers it more probable that the *De Sacramentis* is an expansion of Ambrose's work by another writer, rather than that Ambrose, having written *De Sacramentiis*, should have repeated himself to such an unusual extent in the *De Mysteriis*. The agreement among the critics that between these two works the similarity in principles is great, together with their inability to agree whether the *De Mysteriis* is a condensation of the *De Sacramentis*, or the *De Sacramentis* an expansion of the *De Mysteriis*, may not unnaturally suggest that the one may be very reasonably employed to illustrate the other. More use might have been made in the present volumes of the *De Sacramentis*, especially in those important passages where it certainly does seem to make St. Ambrose's teaching more impressively clear. And certainly in any case it seems correct to say that the teaching in the *De Sacramentis* "differs little if at all from that of St. Ambrose himself."

The Eucharistic teaching of St. Ambrose in the *De Mysterii* is that the Consecration of the Elements is effected by the recitation of our Lord's own words: "This is My Body; This is My Blood" (*Christi sermone conficitur*). Prominence should certainly be given to Ambrose's memorable application to Eucharistic Consecration of the words of the Psalm, "He spake the word and they were made: He commanded and they were created." Ambrose wrote: "The Lord Jesus Himself proclaims, This is My Body. Before the benediction of the heavenly words another nature is named, after the consecration the Body is indicated."* This passage, of course, is quoted. A reference is also given to the *De Sacramentis*. Might not the words advisedly be quoted for their clearness: "This bread is bread before the Sacramental words: when the consecration has taken place from being bread it becomes the flesh of Christ. Let us then declare this. How can that which is bread be the body of Christ? By consecration. But by what words is the consecration effected, and Who is He that spoke them? For everything else which is said before is spoken by the priest, prayer is offered to God . . . but when the time is come for making the venerable Sacrament, the priest no longer uses his own words, but he uses the words of Christ. Therefore the Word of Christ makes this Sacrament."†

* *De Mysteriis*, cap. ix. 52.

† *De Sacramentis*, IV. iv. 14.

Between the two treatises there is no difference in doctrine, but there is a difference in vividness and clearness.

Dr. Dudden brings out very plainly indeed how Ambrose maintained the sacrificial character of the Eucharist, and the very memorable way in which Ambrose connects it with the great Sacrifice which Christ the Eternal Priest is continually pleading in Heaven.

Quite a number of fascinating subjects are discussed on which we should wish to linger. For instance, the resemblances im Ambrose's writings to the Athanasian Creed; the critical question how many of the hymns attributed to him are really his; the service which he rendered to Church music; and how deeply Augustine was moved by the hymns and canticles in the Cathedral at Milan. Recent investigations assign some fourteen or eighteen hymns to the great Bishop of Milan. Dr. Dudden's comment, however, is: "But in the case of many of these poems the evidence of authorship is far from convincing. Indeed, it seems possible to attribute to Ambrose only four hymns with certainty, and two, or perhaps three, others with probability. The authorship of *Æterne rerum Conditor*, *Deus Creator omnium*, *Jam surgit hora tertia*, and *Veni redemptor gentium*—"The authorship of these four is authenticated by Augustine." It must, however, be added that Dr. Dudden is constrained to say: "I wish I was able to follow Dreves in including the fine hymn for Martyrs—'The eternal gifts of Christ the King'—among the genuine Ambrosian production."

Lovers of patristic literature will be deeply indebted to the author of these attractive volumes. We quote the reflection with which his study of Ambrose as a theologian ends. "This Doctor may claim a distinguished place in the history of Western theology. He was the mediator between Eastern and Western theological speculations; he was the ancestor of the Western Mystics; he was in many respects the anticipation of Mediæval Catholicism. He was also, more especially as concerns his doctrine of sin and grace, as Augustine before Augustine. Possibly his significance in the history of theology lies principally in this, that he was by far the richest and greatest of the tributaries which fed that mighty river of Augustinian thought and teaching, which for so many centuries fertilized the intellect of the Western world."

W. J. Sparrow Simpson.

NOTICES

LIVES OF THE PROPHETS. By Stephen L. Caiger, B.D. S.P.C.K. 5s.

THE HEBREW PROPHETS. By Ernest G. Braham, Ph.D. Chapman and Hall. 3s. 6d.

THE GROWTH OF HEBREW RELIGION. By A. R. Stedman, B.A. Bell and Sons. 2s. 6d.

THE ODYSSEY OF ISRAEL. By T. G. Platten, M.A. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE. Edited by H. K. Luce, B.D. Cambridge University Press. 6s.

WHY "CHRISTIAN" SCHOOLS? Edited by Canon H. Danby. Jerusalem. 1s. 3d.

GOD MY FATHER. By Canon F. J. Shirley, Ph.D. S.P.C.K. 1s. 6d.

A SCHOOL SERVICE BOOK. By George Snow. S.P.C.K. 2s.

Those who are trying to teach the Christian religion in our schools certainly cannot complain that they are forgotten by the publishers. The list above represents new books within a short period, all of which deserve some consideration from those who are trying to keep abreast.

The first four titles illustrate the teacher's lack of material for Old Testament teaching, in two directions. First, there is the difficulty of giving the teaching of the Prophets without becoming diffuse. Secondly, there is that need, which lies at the back of most mistakes in Old Testament teaching, the lack of a book which will present in outline the whole of the story, and in such a compass that teachers, who have to read other subjects also, may not be appalled at the task. Mr. Caiger's book, *Lives of the Prophets*, deserves first mention, because it is extremely good and because he has tried, with great success, a new and not easy experiment. Most of the small books deal mainly with the theology and moral outlook of the Prophets, with only such historical context as continuity may require. The author has most wisely reversed that order. His book is really a connected, and reasonably full, outline of Hebrew and Jewish history from 800-100 B.C., illustrated and explained by the lives of the Prophets. This must surely be the right way, if the Prophetic influence is as central as we have believed. The book is enriched, from a teacher's standpoint, by its mastery of the archæological background. It stands out from many similar books as actually giving the help which most teachers require for good class-teaching. Dr. Braham's book, with its analysis of the Prophetic teaching, is directed to the same need. But, it must be said, the author just misses what the first-mentioned book so fully achieves. There are more slips than there ought to be—*e.g.*, "a Deus remota" (p. 141), "Rudolf Ottos' (*sic*) *Das Heilage*" (p. 146); and does Karl Barth really deserve to be classed (p. 140) with Toland as a "deist"? And what is meant by "the virol of moral idealism"?

Mr. Stedman's book, *The Growth of Hebrew Religion*, deserves to be noted by those who are attempting a course of consecutive teaching on the Old Testament in secondary schools and (with necessary modifications) in elementary chools. It is very thorough; there is plenty of background; constant use is made of just the right passages from the Bible; "theology" does not squeeze out "history," and "history" is not "potted." Mr. Stedman knows, also, just exactly how much can

be given to a class in a given space of time. He does not give ready-made lessons, but material from which a teacher can make his own lessons, and plan courses, over a period of four or five years. His judgment, lucidity and carefulness deserve wide reading. Mr. Platten's *The Odyssey of Israel* does not really overlap the object of Mr. Stedman's book. Whilst the latter, most commendably, has the lesson-maker constantly in mind, Mr. Platten is dealing with an earlier stage of the teacher's education. The book has, apparently, grown out of his work in a Church Training College, where he will have found reason to know the young teacher's difficulty in getting an outline-view of the Old Testament. Accordingly, he has experimented, as many will think, in the right way. The period before Isaiah occupies but one-third of the volume. As soon as may be, he takes his reader into the central years of Old Testament history, and fortifies this position by keeping the history of the Pentateuch for the post-Exilic period. Without overloading, he has managed to get in a great deal of information (*e.g.* on "Sacrifice" and "Holiness") which can only be included by wise use of space. If there were an examination for teachers this would be the textbook of many. Meanwhile, though there are no such examinations for the elementary teacher's certificate, the book may be recommended as the best "outline" available.

Mr. Luce's commentary collects thoroughly and sets out with much interest the findings of recent commentators, including a useful account of "form-criticism." But, since the volume is one of the "Bible for Schools," it should be noted that the standpoint is, without reserve, sceptical of the miraculous. The visit of the Shepherds and Angels to Bethlehem provokes the comment, "Few notes are needed for this beautiful tale—pastoral poetry, not history." St. Peter's penitent avowal, "Depart from me . . ." arouses Mr. Luce's indignation. "One cannot help feeling how distasteful such a story, with its motif of wonder intended to convince the future apostles, might have been to Jesus Himself." St. Peter's finding of the grave-clothes is dismissed as pungently. "It is certainly not original, for it is merely a summary of John xx. 3-10, inserted with a harmonizing motive." We do not want the readers of the "Bible for Schools," which has so long and useful service behind it, to grow up in theological blinkers. Where the results of established criticism are assured, let them be recorded. But there is a margin which, despite Mr. Luce's confidence, is still a battle-ground, with not all the casualties on one side. Is it on this margin that commentaries for "Schools and Colleges" can most wisely be written?

The report, provided by Christian educationists in Palestine, which Canon Danby has edited, comes very near home. We too have our question. "How far," we are asked, "can the distinctively Christian school justify itself, over against the State school?" The antithesis, for us, is not so sharp. But it is there, and we are all very ready to learn from the Mission Field. What this book has to say about the ideals of reality and freedom in education, the value of the Christian staff and the Christian ideal of life, is valuable; but the problem is diffused by the fact that the setting is interdenominational. In consequence the assumption seems to be that the Bible lesson is the foundation of religious instruction, and that "dogma" is something, however justifiable, that belongs to the superstructure. Against all compromise with Cowper-Templeism, we have to maintain that the Christian child's religious life began at the Font

and not in the first hour of his first Bible lesson; that his first teacher is the Christian parent, who imparts the tremendous dogma that God hears prayer; and that the fact of religion is a gift of Grace, before there is a capacity for rationalized experience. Whether the editor means this by such a statement as "The teaching of dogma without experience is useless" (p. 78) is not clear.

Dr. Shirley's book, *God my Father*, strikes a new note. He seems to have begun with the idea of providing his own boys at King's School, Canterbury, with materials for daily prayer and preparation for Communion, and then to have concluded, most wisely, that a devotional manual was the right place in which to give teaching about prayer and the essentials of the Christian life. This he has done in a happy proportion. The manual remains the boy's guide to his prayers and his Communion and Confession (the Holy Communion Service is printed *in extenso*, with devotions), and yet contains nine short, but sufficient, instructions on the Church and its teaching. It should be the ideal "Communion Book" for boys, not only at the Public Schools, for which it was written, but for other boys in our parochial Confirmation classes.

Mr. Snow's *A School Service Book* is intended for public use, as its title declares. During the past decade those in charge of school services, at all sorts of schools, have been looking for something that had the essentials of such worship—viz., simplicity, the right kind of dignity, imagination, freedom, and a due link with recognized liturgical worship. Here is a book that seems to meet all the requirements. It is both "ancient" and "modern" in the right way. Designed for Sunday and weekday use, it ought to be invaluable, both in the schools and for all other occasions, such as services in church, where young people meet for worship in non-liturgical services.

J. R. Lumb.

Origen on First Principles: Being the text of the *De Principiis* translated into English, together with an Introduction and Notes. By G. W. Butterworth, Litt.D. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Butterworth has already earned the gratitude of patristic students by his translation of an important section of the works of Clement of Alexandria. In the present goodly volume he gives us a most careful rendering of the important treatise by the great Origen, known under its Greek title as *περὶ ἀρχῶν*. Important because, in its four books, the speculative theology of the Alexandrine Father is there presented, more or less, in its completeness, despite the fact that it is the work of a comparatively young man. But then, as Jerome once said, "Origen was great even from his cradle." The *De Principiis* is not his most significant work; his amazingly learned *Hexapla* counts for more; perhaps, too, his famous piece of apologetic *Contra Celsum* has higher claims on our attention today; but this treatise of his youth cannot be ignored. His range was enormous, his industry indefatigable, as we may discover if we read the *De Principiis* with the care—and patience—which it deserves. What does he not attempt? Nothing less than to expound the whole doctrine of God, of creation, of redemption, and of the province of Scripture, in the "philosophy" which he sets forward. He was, says Dr. Butterworth, the exponent of the Christian tradition to thoughtful men. As a whole, this work is extant only in the somewhat garbled Latin version of Rufinus,

but portions of it are to be found in Greek in the *Philocalia*, a collection of extracts from Origen's works compiled by Gregory and Basil. Dr. Butterworth gives us translations both from the Greek and also from the Latin rendering of Rufinus, so that we see at a glance where Rufinus has exercised the "blue pencil" or added to the original—both methods in the supposed interests of orthodoxy. For Origen, with all his spiritual depth and his unbounded loyalty to what he conceived to be truth, was certainly not orthodox; and, after reading his treatise throughout, one can hardly be surprised that he caused offence to those who had little patience with excursions into Gnostic theology, and that he brought upon himself the censure not only of men like Jerome but of the Church generally. Origen is a curious mixture of radical and conservative; his speculations were often as fanciful as daring; yet it may be allowed that he was not guilty of formal heresy, though he sometimes came perilously near it. The salvability of Satan, the pre-existence of souls, the undue stress he laid on mystical interpretations of Scripture—we are most of us acquainted with these things; if not, we shall learn what is to be known from Dr. Butterworth's admirably succinct Introduction. He points out that the weakness of the Origenistic system lies in its assumption that the entire cosmic process is a mistake due to the misuse of free will; hence Origen regarded it as axiomatic that the end of that process must be like the beginning. Whether, in his old age, he moved away from the position taken up in the *de Principiis*, it is not easy to be sure; but it is difficult to suppose that he did not, as his thought broadened and developed, modify some of his conclusions, for "he had a scientific spirit and used a scientific method." His great fault, as a writer, is his prolixity; to use Carlyle's vigorous phrase, "he had no fire in his belly"; consequently he is often tiresome and dull. None the less he provokes thought and compels attention. What is more, he may well have a message for the formidable times in which we are living. As de Faye remarks, his ideas not seldom suggest a solution of some of the problems that beset us, directing our thoughts along the right channel.

Hitherto, we may imagine, students have been content to read *about* Origen; they are more familiar with (let us say) Westcott's admirable article in the D.C.B., or the brilliant little work of de Faye, than with the writings of the man himself. They will have less excuse now, as Dr. Butterworth has given us not only an excellent rendering of a difficult original, but an illuminating account of Origen's life and teaching; in addition to which he has provided the student with brief but useful footnotes, and a reasonably full index. Our only regret is that he did not see his way to provide a separate volume of commentary such as Lawson and Oulton's in their edition of Eusebius. Some day, perhaps, he will give us a really competent edition of the *Contra Celsum*; it has long been a desideratum.

E. H. Blakeney.

The Development of Religious Toleration in England. By W. K. Jordan. Allen and Unwin. 21s.

Dr. Jordan is favourably known to scholars by his able and thoughtful volume on the growth of religious toleration in our land from the beginnings of the Reformation to the death of Queen Elizabeth. Now he continues his study in an equally able and thoughtful volume on its

progress from the accession of James I. to the meeting of the Long Parliament. If he will allow us to say so, it is evident that his prolonged course of reading and meditation has resulted in a second volume bearing every sign of well-digested study and penetrating insight into the complex causes that imposed on the seventeenth century the toleration that the Reformation, in the long run, was bound to make inevitable. We have often thought of an English parallel. The English worship rank just as much as the Americans—the author is an instructor in history at Harvard—and they also worship money nearly as much as our cousins across the Atlantic. In the midst of the worship of the competing deities of rank and money, the true deity, merit, attains a chance of meeting with appropriate recognition that might not otherwise fall to its lot. A mediæval body with one Church was almost of necessity bound to be intolerant. A modern body with more than one Church has almost of necessity to be tolerant—in time. It was a case of competing deities.

Unity of Church and State and unity in Church and State were of the last importance to the early seventeenth-century man, and it is difficult for anyone, even for Dr. Jordan, to attain such an understanding of this man as to see with his eyes and to grasp with his heart all that disunity of Church and State and disunity in Church and State might mean to the future of both. The last word betrays us, for the seventeenth-century man could hardly conceive what we meant by using both. To him the body to which he belonged was one, though when he regarded it from the secular angle he might call it the State, while if he regarded it from the ecclesiastical angle, he might call it the Church. But to be a citizen was to be a Churchman, and to be a Churchman was to be a citizen. No one can read Hooker in the most superficial fashion without feeling that to him Churchmanship and citizenship were one and the same thing which might—we lay stress on might—be conceived from different standpoints. Accordingly, what was the hope of toleration? Above all, what was the hope of toleration for the Roman Catholic body? It was a body whose head in 1570 definitely deposed Queen Elizabeth from her throne. How could any patriotic Englishman tolerate such a body? We have read all the pamphlets of the period the author describes just as diligently perhaps as he has, and the one point that remains firmest in our mind as the result of our perusal is the horror inspired in the breast of the pamphleteers of the deposing power claimed by the Church of Rome. No early seventeenth-century casuist takes the line of Pascal in his *Provincial Letters*. On the other hand, writer after writer, of the stamp of Lancelot Andrewes, denounces not the doctrinal errors of the Church of Rome, but her interference with the liberties of the average Englishman. Perhaps what we miss most in this book is the bringing home to its reader what the men of 1603 to 1640 conceived to be the dangers to be feared from Rome. These dangers were emphatically political, not religious, and these political dangers loomed large in the minds of all.

It is possible to argue that the temporal possessions of the Papacy conferred benefit upon it during the Dark Ages and even for a long time during the Middle Ages. Such a position is one we can well understand, and yet when we come to the seventeenth century we wonder if the temporal power was still useful. For it placed the Pope in the position of a temporal prince who often fought for his hand as a temporal prince, forgetful of the fact that he was the spiritual head of a great communion.

Think of the attitude of an Englishman in the reign of James I. as he contemplated his chief foe in Spain. Behind Spain he perceived—or he thought he perceived—the mighty power of the Vatican, and this power lay behind the greatest military and naval power then upon earth. He was waging a life-and-death warfare, and in this warfare he was continually meeting with the Pope and the sustainer of this warfare against him. And of course the Spain of James I.'s generation was the Spain that seemed to dominate the earth. Even when the feet of the giant were perceived to be of clay and not brass, Spain was superseded by France, the eldest son of the Church. The foe might be Madrid or Paris, but the one outstanding foe was Rome, and we could wish that the author had entered more into the spirit of the early seventeenth-century man in compelling us to realize that this spirit of the time is the all-important matter to grasp to the utmost of our ability.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

OUR FAITH IN GOD. By W. R. Matthews. S.C.M. 2s. 6d.

We welcome "The Diocesan Series," to which the Dean of St. Paul's has contributed the opening volume in his thoughtful survey of *Our Faith in God* and to which the Bishop of Southwark has written a laudatory introduction. While the whole book reaches the high level of thought we naturally expect from Dean Matthews, perhaps the noblest piece of reasoning in it is the vindication of personality in God and therefore in man. In the face of the mass production and the mass movements of our generation, it is well to emphasize, as the author does, the worth of the personality of every man. This does not mean for a moment that all souls possess equal value in the eyes of our Father, for the parable of the talents plainly forbids any belief in the equality of man or his equal response to grace. But it does mean that God cares for us all, and that the more we care for Him and the more we seek to carry out His will, the more dear we are to Him and the more worth we are to the world. Each of us is unique.

R. H. MURRAY.

THE GOD WHO SPEAKS. By B. H. Streeter. Macmillan. 5s.

Anything Provost Streeter writes is sure to be thoughtful and thought-provoking. His book, accordingly, is sure of a welcome beforehand. It is also sure of a welcome for the sake of the unifying principle it possesses, for it co-ordinates much that up to the present we had not dreamt of co-ordinating, and this co-ordination is achieved with distinct success. The burden of the book is to go to shew that not only has God spoken in the past, but that He is also speaking in the present—if we would but listen to His voice. It is not He who is dumb: it is we who are deaf, though the deafness can be unstopped. Now there is nothing here with which a well-instructed theologian will not agree. The novelty lies not in the manner but in the mode of the interpretation, and the author is distinctly ingenious in his manifold mode of interpretation. No one can, for instance, read the illuminating section on creative vision without feeling deeply impressed not only by the outlook of the seer, but also by the

learning of the scholar, though the author would doubtless put the former quality the higher of the two. He is notably strong on the latency of the mysterious powers the mind possesses, powers not sufficiently evoked till we put our will, our whole will, at the disposal of our Father. Here, indeed, he connects the work of the prophets, notably of Amos and Hosea, of Isaiah and Micah, with the inspiration of latter ages. Nor does he hesitate to avow his conviction that Confucius in China, the Buddha in India, and Xenophanes in Ionia simultaneously voice the protest of the prophets against the futilities and immoralities of what men then called religion. In truth, with the Provost the transition from the natural to the supernatural is so easy that he almost wonders what is natural and what is supernatural. There is nothing finer in this fine book than this unifying quality of all the forces that go to the making of a life lived on the highest plane. Accordingly, we meet this unifying quality on all sides. If Dr. Streeter proceeds from the prophets of the Old Testament to those of the New, he is still engaged with prophecy, with the divers manners and the sundry fashions in which He spoke in days gone by, but he is also engaged with the fact that He spoke, and the essential quality of His message has not vitally altered, for He is the God with whom is no shadow of turning. From a different angle his book also deserves considerable attention, for it powerfully sets forth the theology of the Oxford Group Movement.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE LATER PAULINE EPISTLES. By E. A. Gardiner. S.P.C.K. 4s.

This excellent little book is a companion volume to the author's recently published *Earlier Pauline Epistles*. A model of compression, within the short compass of 240 well-printed pages it contains a complete commentary, with Introduction, English Text (R.V.), Notes on the same page, and an Examination Paper on each of the Captivity and of the Pastoral Epistles. It sounds incredible, but so it is. The Introductions are scholarly, combining a conservative point of view with an admirably impartial statement of the problems of authorship, date, interpretation, etc. The compression necessitated by the inclusion of so much matter within so small a space makes a demand upon the reader for close attention and for consultation of references, but in the hands of any interested master or lecturer any amount of material is provided for fascinating excursions into what has hitherto been a rather neglected by-way of Pauline study. In the footnotes, the aim has obviously been not to teaze the last drop of significance from any individual word of the text, but rather to get an understanding of the passage as a whole. To this end, each Epistle is divided into logical sections, and each section is prefixed by a brief explanatory paragraph, an arrangement which the student will find extremely convenient. The book, in fact, reaches the high-watermark of teaching technique, with the possible exception of the map, which might well have been out-paged for easier reference. The Questions at the end of each Epistle may be of some value to a Study Circle: for schoolboys they are not a little dangerous in their implication. The chief excellence of this One-Volume Commentary is that it enables the student to approach these groups of Epistles as a whole, and interest grows as the chain of association is steadily forged. In my young days we used to pass gaily from Galatians to Philippians without taking

breath: a book like this makes one realize how infinitely luckier our children are to-day. It is admirably adapted for Sixth Form or Training College standards.

STEPHEN L. CAIGER.

SENSE AND THOUGHT. A Study in Mysticism. By Greta Hort, M.A., Ph.D. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

At least a whole copy of THEOLOGY would be filled if I were to attempt an adequate criticism of this extremely subtle and provoking book. Miss Hort has taken for her subject the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing*, and has penetrated most acutely into the processes of his thought. The exact nature of his thought's object and content seems, however, to have eluded her. So we have before us good Psychology and bad Mysticism.

The author has evidently, unknown to herself, projected her own metaphysical ideas upon the Christian author of the *Cloud of Unknowing*, and, because her own mental processes have a natural affinity with his, has assumed that he believed what she believes—or rather, that his creed has the same gaps in it as hers.

The whole book is startlingly reminiscent of an article by Miss Helen Wodehouse, which appeared some time ago in THEOLOGY. The expression "leaping flame" and, in general, the unusually beautiful style, gave the clue; and Miss Wodehouse's extreme subjectivity (as I understand her philosophy, perhaps mistakenly) has influenced every page of *Sense and Thought*. Only when I was half-way through the book did I notice the dedication.

In Miss Wodehouse's article she advocated a curious practice—namely, the offering of "orison" to the Supreme Good, as a substitute for Christian prayer. Evidently Miss Hort has been following this advice, with the result that mystical experience presents itself to her as a form of heightened self-consciousness, and God as "the Whole" (*cf.* p. 251). She has found this experience satisfying, and proceeds to assume that the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* had also found a similar experience satisfying, and had been able to dispense with all valid belief in the Incarnation.

Might I, in all seriousness, suggest that Miss Hort should next turn her attention to the vast unexplored tracts of Buddhist mysticism? Dr. E. S. Thomas, one of whose opinions she is bold enough to question, would certainly be kind enough to guide her. We should be deeply interested to know her further psychological reactions when she had found by experience that she was not a *self* at all, but merely a stream of consciousness.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL. By Edith Hamilton. J. M. Dent and Sons. 8s. 6d.

I doubt whether this book will be of much interest to readers of THEOLOGY. Miss Hamilton frankly confesses to no special knowledge of the subject, her chief claim to a hearing being that "freshness" of approach which undeniably sometimes distinguishes the intelligent novice in any sphere of enquiry. And it must be conceded at once that

Miss Hamilton is very fresh with the Prophets. They emerge from a bout of unabashed woman-handling in a quite dishevelled and almost unrecognizable condition, suffused with purple patches of which the publishers are evidently quite proud. "The beauty of ritual, the pealing organ, the full-voic'd quire, the service high and anthem clear, the pious incense from a censer old, all the ceremonial in great temple or church, beloved by poets and artists and musicians, is utterly reprobated by them (the Prophets). . . . His worship had no connection whatever with anything done in a temple. It had to do entirely with man's actions towards each other" (p. 48). After this, the liturgically minded reader will wonder just what is the point of the Swedenborg quotation on the title-page to the effect that "The Kingdom of God is a Kingdom of *Uses*"! Unfortunately the full-voic'd harmonies of the author's lyric style are marred too frequently by the noise of dropping bricks. For 200 openwork pages of this sort of thing the publisher's price seems high.

STEPHEN L. CAIGER.

RELIGIONS OF MANKIND. By Otto Karrer. Translated by E. I. Watkin. Sheed and Ward. 10s. 6d.

A most interesting work, marked above all by an extraordinary charity and sympathy towards other forms of religion, primitive and modern, than the Christianity and the Catholicism to which, in the view of the author, they all lead up. Both Natural and Revealed Religion receive their full tributes from his pen. He faces the tensions between Transcendence and Immanence, and between the religious and thinking faculties in man. The one is resolved in the term "panentheism," the other is left "as an everlasting conflict, indeed the most titanic struggle, of humanity, whose object is God." He quotes from an Indian sage, "All men know that the majesty of the Lord is unutterable—*yet* who can withstand the desire to utter it?" and St. Augustine's "All are at pains to say of God the highest they can conceive." (He might have added Augustine's "Vae tacentibus de Te, quoniam loquaces muti sunt.") He quotes authorities to shew that salvation is not limited to the visible Church, as against Cardinal Billot's view that the heathen, and unbaptized infants, are necessarily excluded from *super*natural happiness. Even atheism (Western as well as Eastern) may be noble as a revulsion from anthropomorphism, and from the idea that God is, in Eckhart's sarcastic phrase, "the milch-cow of the faithful." He has some striking phrases: "Religion means 'both . . . and,' not 'either . . . or.'" "We Christians are always half pagans, and pagans quarter Christians." "It is customary to group the *multiplicity* of religious systems under two main types, the Platonic and the Antiplatonic, the Aristotelian. These, however, are no more than artificial categories." We congratulate the author on his book, and the Roman authority at Westminster on its imprimatur.

J. H. MCCUBBIN.

THE RENEWING GOSPEL. By Walter Russell Bowie. Scribners. 6s.

An expansion of the Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching, delivered in Yale University in April, 1935. Despite a somewhat superficial brilliance of style, and a too sweeping impatience with "orthodox

irrelevances," this book, written from the standpoint of a moderate liberalism, contains much of which we need to be reminded—*e.g.* (in Chapter I.), that "people require (1) to be made to feel that life makes sense, (2) to be instructed, (3) to be encouraged and comforted." But chapters V. and VI. are markedly superior to the rest of the work; entitled respectively "Human Nature and the Spirit of Christ" and "Christian Ideals confronting a Recalcitrant World," they stress the absolute personal supremacy of our Lord, and pass on the apocalyptic message of the Theology of Crisis. The book will prove a useful seed-basket for the popular preacher.

J. H. McCubbin.

Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology. By William McDougall, M.B., F.R.S. Methuen. 7s. 6d.

In these lectures, delivered in London University in May, 1935, Professor McDougall states once again his Theory of Suggestion, as propounded in what he regards as his *magnum opus*, the *Introduction to Social Psychology*, written in 1907 before his acquaintance with the writings of Professor Freud, and first published in 1908. He greatly regrets now that he did not then express his views in a more clamant form. The present lectures contain a "friendly but ruthless" criticism of Freud's theories of the sexual origin of psychological conditions, in particular that of the Œdipus-complex, which is now completely rejected by Adler, transformed by Jung into something quite different, and considerably modified in latter years by Freud himself, who now admits that this complex does not exist in the normal adult. We should have liked to have a more positive statement of Professor McDougall's own views; one leaves the present work with the feeling that, whether Freudians or anti-Freudians, we shall all be post-Freudians.

J. H. McCubbin.

A New Church Psalter. O.U.P. 2s. 6d.

This Psalter, arranged by Mr. W. Bernard Smith, is an attempt to make the Psalms more useful for ordinary congregational use. The considerable omissions from many of the Psalms are, for this purpose, a move in the right direction, though the work seems to have been carried out without any consideration for the rhythm of the original poetry, which might in many cases have been preserved with very slight rearrangement. The verbal alterations which have been made are not always very happy, and a footnote would in many instances have been better than a change of wording; on the other hand, many small changes might well have been made (*e.g.*, in confusion of personal pronouns) where the text has been left unaltered. The pointing in this version is of a very elaborate nature, and it would prove very difficult for congregational use without extensive practices.

G. Snow.

Wrestlers with Christ. By Karl Pfleger. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

It is rare and most refreshing to find a book which is original without being unorthodox, for usually those who write anything which is startling and new are anti-traditionalists. In this book Karl Pfleger is most

original and most orthodox, and so his work is indeed a *rara avis*. It is written in a most magnificent prose—for this that excellent Roman Catholic philosopher, E. I. Watkin, is to be thanked because in his translation of *Geister die um Christus ringen* he has retained the nobility of expression as found in the German work—and with a most acute discernment of people and ideas. Some of the passages will haunt the sympathetic reader for many a long day. And there is need for the sympathetic reader, because the theme of the book may be unknown in certain lives.

The conflict between man and Christ is mainly one of faith and not of ethics; there is an inner tension caused by man's desire to believe in God and Christ and by the mental revolt from such a commitment. Man wants to believe, but there are obstacles which prevent him. The result is that awful struggle between God and man, faith and reason, and the paradox is that if man wins he is defeated, but if God wins, then man too wins. If a man loses his mind and soul to God, then he has really found them. But it takes a brave man to surrender all.

Karl Pfleger has taken as examples of the struggle between man and God such well-known characters as Léon Bloy, Charles Péguy, André Gide, G. K. Chesterton, Dostoievsky, Vladimir Soloviev, and Nicholas Berdaiev. Perhaps the best study is that of Bloy as the pilgrimage of the Absolute, and, indeed, there is something in this particular essay for which there is none other word than "terrific." The French geologist Pierre Termier once said of Bloy's writings, "He made me weep a great deal," and such is an apt remark about this chapter. Ploy was both the tragic wrestler and the restless tragedian. He wanted God, but he wanted much else beside, and was not wise enough to realize that in God were all the treasures of the world.

In his examination of Soloviev the writer has given an admirable summary of his somewhat difficult philosophical position, the key to which is *theandrism* (Divine humanity), but it must also be remembered that for the contemporary religious philosophers of Orthodoxy there is no Christ apart from *Sophia*. But no man logically understands *Sophia*; her meaning is only apprehended by mystical intuition. Karl Pfleger says of this Sophianic mysticism that it is "extraordinarily profound, at once in the closest possible contact with the world and the most remote from it" (p. 254). Every barbed-wire entanglement was set against Soloviev finding his spiritual home in the Church of Rome, yet he forced his way through though mutilated in the act. He got what he set out to find, but he had to wrestle long for it. Very different was the contest which Péguy fought, but the reward was the same. Both wanted the only Christ and, as the Roman Catholics would say, the only Church. Péguy was consumed with an inextinguishable longing for Jesus, but it was years before he found Him in and through His Church. The night before he died in the Great War he spent in decking an altar of the Virgin.

The only essay which seems unsatisfactory in this book is that on the mammoth "G. K. C.," and probably the reason is that Karl Pfleger only sees the Franciscan side in the character of whom he is writing. But if there was something of the Poverello in Chesterton, there was much in his later years of the Angelic Doctor, and it is worthy of note that no reference is made to Chesterton's brilliant work on St. Thomas. This is a strange omission.

The lover of literature, theology, philosophy and mysticism will find

in this book limitless food for thought, and must be a wiser man for reading it. Perhaps best it will be understood by those who know something about true mysticism, that in the tradition of St. John of the Cross and Dom John Chapman, but all who have active minds and are searching for Truth will find it most personal and revealing, and so they may be led to understand the supreme truth contained in Pascal's famous dictum: "Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas."

It is a pity and a drawback that the sources and authors of the larger quotations have not been given at the foot of each page.

PATRICK COWLEY.

DAS ESCHATOLOGISCHE DENKEN DER GEGENWART. By Folke Holmström. Translated into German by H. Kruska. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1936. Price 13 RM. (unbound); 15 RM. (bound).

This is an abridgement (albeit of well over 400 pages) and translation of a treatise originally written in Swedish, the purpose of which is to describe the part eschatological conceptions have played in the theology of the last forty years. Its method is clearly set forth at the outset. "The concern of our investigations . . . is not what recent theologians have worked out in the concrete on the questions of eschatology, but what their fundamental attitude to eschatology has been" (pp. 1 *f.*). Actually Dr. Holmström's studies are severely limited to the theologies of German- and Swedish-speaking Protestants. No one will complain that the book is marred either by brevity or by an inadequate range of facts. It is teeming with *data*, about which the author appears throughout to write with knowledge. But the fact that no reference is made to the limitation just mentioned suggests that for Dr. Holmström *das Denken der Gegenwart* means the thought of Protestant Germany and Sweden. That there are parts of Christendom—our own Communion, for instance, to say nothing of the Roman Catholic Church—where eschatological thought of the kind with which he deals has filled only a small place is a fact curiously overlooked.

"Dogmatic Theology" (*Dogmatik*) always tends to be somewhat schematic and formal; and Dr. Holmström has succeeded in giving his study an appropriately schematic mould. In the last four decades, he observes, eschatological thought has developed by a dialectical process. Its three periods have been (i.) the *zeitgeschichtliche Epoche*, of which Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer are the two most characteristic representatives, eschatology being here thought of as happening in the time-process; (ii.) the *ungeschichtliche Epoche* (Karl Barth and the Dialectical School, also Paul Althaus), where eschatology has become essentially supra-historical; and (iii.) the beginnings of an *Offenbarungsgeschichtliche Synthese*. The final period is less sharply defined than the other two, the names of those whose work comes up for consideration here being Karl Heim, Ernst Lohmeyer, and Walther Künneth.

Dr. Holmström inspires confidence as a guide. The long welter of theories which follow one another so rapidly in his pages would seem to give a good picture of academic German theology since the time when the liberalism of the Harnack School began to be called in question. But they raise in the reader's mind all kinds of questions. For instance: (1) How does it come about that Christianity, a single Faith, should be interpreted in such radically different ways? (2) What is the impulse

behind all these speculative formulations? (3) What influence do they exercise outside the limited circles of academic theology? (4) Is all the *odium theologicum* they clearly engender inevitable or worth while? (5) On what grounds, on the principles of German Protestantism, are the conflicting eschatological doctrines to be judged as good or bad?

There seems, indeed, to be no answer to the last of these questions, unless it be Conformity with the conceptions of the Reformers of the sixteenth century. Every theology is bound to fall back on some such "irrational" test as this when it has abandoned its faith in Reason. And in Reason German Protestantism has never believed. It has, rather, exulted in indifference to its claims. To distrust Reason has been equally characteristic of the Ritschlian "Liberalism" and of the long series of twentieth-century speculations which fills Dr. Holmström's pages. Harnack regarded the attempt to elucidate the Christian Faith with the aid of the categories of Greek rationalism as a mark of degeneracy, while in his later German critics the aversion to reason has been still more marked. The ennobling and enlightening effect which the study of Patristic theology has exercised upon many branches of historic Christendom has left German theology unmoved. Not less noteworthy is the fact that perhaps the greatest mind that Germany has ever produced, and one, moreover, that was profoundly concerned with matters of theology and religion—we refer to Leibniz—has exercised next to no influence on the main-stream of German Protestantism. Kant is only a seeming exception. The Kant whom the theologians have loved has been not the Kant of theoretical interests, but the Kant who had to abandon knowledge in order to make way for faith. We suspect that it is in this Irrationalism that is to be discovered the origin of the bizarre theologies which fill Dr. Holmström's pages.

F. L. Cross.

Our Old English Fairs. R. W. Muncey. Sheldon Press. 6s.

I remember once meeting an old lady who told me that she used when a child to be taken to St. Bartholomew's Fair in Smithfield, there to see her mother purchase lengths of woollen stuff for the family's winter dresses. As the fair was closed in 1843, the purchases were probably made about a hundred years ago, at a place where similar transactions had been carried on annually for seven hundred years.

This charming little book takes us right back to the early days of fairs, when kings granted charters to abbeys, priories, lepers' hospitals, and so on, as well as to cities and boroughs, allowing such public markets to be held. There is a distinct flavour of the Middle Ages about fairs, and one is surprised that they should have survived, especially in the heart of London, even as late as 1843. More astonishing, however, is the fact that several of them shew no signs of dying out yet.

At Cambridge one may still, I am told, see professors and their wives at Michaelmas Fair circling hilariously on roundabouts, while bachelor dons prowl around buying "throw-out" china for their college rooms, Oxford, during St. Giles' Fair, disposes of all foreign taunts that the English take their pleasures sadly, and the sober walls of St. John's and Balliol (to say nothing of Pusey House), look down benevolently on a most un-English carnival.

Strange that *homo sapiens* should find pleasure in being lifted up and

dragged down in purposeless rhythm on the swings, and whirled around in circles, without arriving anywhere, on the roundabouts! Foolish pursuits, indeed. Equally foolish, however, and far more dangerous, to lift one's country up to Fascism one moment and to dash it down to Communism the next. Or, even when we are men of peace, we are perhaps better employed in climbing on a *cheval-de-bois* in a fair, than in mounting the high horse in the pages of a Church newspaper and trampling on other men's convictions for the pleasure of putting our betters in the wrong.

There is nothing diabolical about Mr. Muncey's book, but it suggested to me that perhaps the devil had recently received a charter to establish fairs in Russia, Mexico, Spain and elsewhere. What the devil loses on the roundabouts, he very naturally hopes to make up on the swings.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

THE INTELLECTUALISM OF SAINT THOMAS. Pierre Rousselot, S.J. Translated with a Foreword by James E. O'Mahony, Ph.D., D.Litt. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

This profound exposition, admirably translated, is the work of a Jesuit professor who died a victim of the Great War. Its object is to explain and uphold St. Thomas's doctrine that the highest good is to be sought in an action of the intellect rather than of the will. It is by intelligence, St. Thomas taught, that reality is embraced and acquired. God is the supreme Intelligence, and it is by virtue of intelligence (or vision, if that term be preferred) that man is *capax Dei*. Contemplation is the ultimate end of man's being, and contemplation is the fulfilment of that aspiration which we call Love. Will is a tendency: Intellect gives possession of reality. But, the author points out, this "Intellectualism" does not mean an exultation of the value of mere human reasoning. So far is this from being the case that at the end of his life the great doctor of the Church confessed that all that he had written now appeared to him as so much straw. He turned from reasoning to contemplation; but in so doing he was establishing rather than contradicting his own contention that concept, judgment and reasoning are in a decreasing scale of perfection. The highest act of the intellect is an intuition, and the human soul, though the lowest of intellectual creatures, has the power of intuition; and to exercise this power is its noblest activity.

✠ KENNETH BRECHIN.

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